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The  merits  of decentralized  decision  making  in  the  private  sector  have  become
well widely  accepted.  Decentralization  induces  competitive  behavior  among  firms
thereby  improving  economic efficiency. As well, decentralization  improves technical
efficiency both  by reducing  administrative  overheads  and  by allowing information
to  be used  more effectively.  It  allows for more innovation  and  enables  decisions  to
be made  by  those  closest  to the  ultimate  users of the  products  of the economy.  It
also improves  efficiency within  firms by reducing monitoring  and  agency costs,  and
enhancing  productive  effort.
At  the  same  time,  there  are  limits  to  the  extent  of decentralization  that  is
possible  or desirable  in  the private  sector.  Economies of scale can be  important  in
various dimensions and in various sectors.  The least-cost  output  in some sectors  may
require  large  amounts  of capital,  as in  transportation  and  utilities.  Network  and
information  economies might be important  in some sectors, such as communications.
Sectors  for  which  research  and  development  or  risk  sharing  are  important  may
benefit  from  scale economies.  In the  end,  the advantages  of decentralization  must
be  set  against  those  of scale  in  determining  the  optimal  size of firms  in  various
sectors  and  the  optimal  structure  of decision making  within  firms.
Similar  issues arise in  the  public  sector.  There  are  advantages  and  disadvan-
tages  of decentralizing  the  various  functions  of government  from  higher  levels  to
lower levels.  The literature  on fiscal federalism is devoted in large part  to analyzing
the  consequeLces  of varying  degrees and  forms of decentralizing  and  to  suggesting
the  desirable  extent  of decentralization  in  various contexts.  Much of the  literature
draws on  the  practice  and  circumstances  in  industrialized  countries,  where  federal
systems  of economic decision making have evolved over a longer period of time.  One
of the  main  purposes  of this  paper  is to  review some of the elements  of the  litera-
ture  on fiscal federalism  that  have been developed  in  the context  of industrialized
countries  and  to judge how they apply  to the setting  of developing countries  where,
by and  large,  decision making  has been much more centralized.
The  analog with  decentralization  in the private  sector is, of course,  only an im-
1perfect  one.  The  sorts of economic decisions that  the public  sector  undertakes  are
mi'  1i different  than  those  of the  private  sector.  Private  sector firms  are typically
interested  in  maximizing  profits  from  the  sale of goods  and  services.  The  public
sector,  on the other  hand,  engages largely in non-market  activities.  Broadly speak-
ing,  this  involveb two sorts of things  - the provision  of goods and  services (usually
free of charge),  and  the  making  of transfei  payments  to  the  private  sector.  Some
of the  goods and services provided  by the public  sector are 'public'  in the economic
sense,  but  many  are  of a  private  nature.  We shall  use  the  term  quasi-private  to
refer  to  goods  provided  by the  public  sector  which  are private  in  nature.  Though
some  revenues  are obtained  in  the  public  sector  by charges  or user  fees for goods
and  services provided,  the  bulk  of the revenue  comes from taxation  of one form  or
another.  A key difference between  the public sector and  the private  sector concerns
the  objectives  used for economic decision making.  Those  used  in the  public  sector
may include  the traditional  normative  ones of economic efficien .y and redistributive
equity,  as well as the positive  ones of maximizing  political  or electoral  support  and
responding  to  the influence of bureaucrats  and  pressure  groups.
Whatever  the  motivating  forces  guiding  public  sector  decision  mtaking might
be,  there  are still advantages  to be weighed against  disadvantages  from decentraliz-
ing decision making  to lower levels of government.  Part  of the purpose  of this paper
will be to outline  what  those  advantages  and disadvantages  might be, and  to discuss
alternative  ways in  which the  desired  degree of decentralization  has  been  and  can
be  achieved  in  practice.  The  degree  and  form  of decentralization  of various  tax
and  expenditure  decisions depends  upon  the  political,  economic  and  institutional
characteristics  of the  country  in  question,  as well as on the  role that  governments
actually  assume.  This  is of  special  importance  in  the  context  of considering  de-
centralization  in  de  oping  countries,  since their  features  are  somewhat  different
than  those  found  in  industrialized  countries,  where  considerable  decentralization
has  often been  the practice.
We proceed  with  a review of the principles  of fiscEd  federalism  as they  have evolved
in  the  context  of industrialized  countries.  Next  we discuss the  way in which multi-
level  fiscal  affairs  have  tended  to  be  organized  in  developing  countries.  Finally,
we offer our  observations  about  some  desirab'2  directions  for change.  Our  overall
objective  is to  indicate  how the  benefits  of decentralized  decision  making  within
a federation  may  be achieved without  sacrificing the  advantages  of achieving basic
national  efficiency and equity objectives,  or even sometimes  by contributing  to them.II.  A REVIEW  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  FISCAL  FEDERALISM
It is useful to begin with a summary of the relevant theory of fiscal federalism as
it has been developed in the economics literature.  Much of it  has evnived in the
context of industrialized countries, since it is in these countries that  institutions of
federalism have been most firmly established. However,  many of the principles are
of more general applicability. 1
Fiscal federalism is concerned  with economic  decision making in federal systems
of government, that  is, in systems of government in which public sector decisions
can be taken at various levels of government. The overriding issue in fiscal feder-
alism is referred to as the assignment problem, that is, the assignment of taxation,
expenditure and  regulatory responsibilities tc various levels of government.  The
key issue here concerns the optimal degree of decentralization of public sector de-
cisions of different sorts.  The assignment of functions is, of course, conditional on
the sorts of roles undertaken by the public sector and also on the objectives of gov-
ernment intervention in the first place.  We begin this section with a discussion of
the role of governments in a market economy generally, and the special problems
for government that  arise in a federal economy.
Next, we turn  to the assignment of functions. The benefits and costs of decen-
tralization  are outlined, both for the expenditure and for the tax side of the public
sector budget.  Decentralization can take varying forms ranging from assigning ex-
clusive jurisdiction for a given function to a given level of government to situations
of co-occupied jurisdictions in which one level of government is able to influence
the  decisions taken by the other in  varying degrees through mechanisms such as
regulation,  the power to override decisions or financial intervention.  To some ex-
tent,  the  amount  of decentralization on the  expenditure side can be determined
independently of that on the tax side.
The way in which the assignment function is resolved then determines the sort
of fiscal relations that  should exist between levels of government. Intergovernmen-
tal fiscal relations include the structure of transfers between levels of government,
the division of the tax room, and any requirement for one level of government to
assert influence over the decisions taken by another  by financial means.  The de-
centralization of functions also gives rise to both  the desire and the opportunity
for di"  rent governments to  coordinate or harmonize their  policies.  Such coordi-
nation can cL ur horizontally among governments at the  same level, or vertically
The classic references  to fiscal federalism  are Musgrave  (1959) and  Oa;es  (1972).  More recent
treatments  include  Breton  and  Scott  (1978),  Boadway  and  Wildasin  (1984),  Wildasin  (1986)
and  Boadway  (1992).
3between governments at  different levels.  The final part  of this  section discusses
intergovernmental fiscal relations including mechanisms for the  harmrnization  of
policies.
1.  Government  Intervention  in a  Market  Economy
The merits of leaving economic decisions  to the private sector in a market economy
are well  recognized. The decentralized nature of these decisions  and the competitive
setting in which they are taken both contribute to efficiency  in resource allocation.
From this point of view, a necessary condition for government iDtervention  must be
some form of market failure. Gowernment  intervention is called for when the benefits
of collective decision making outwveigh  the loss of decentralized individual decision
making. Whether that will be the case in any given circumstances will be a matter
of judgment.  For one thing, in  she event that  the  private sector yields inefficient
outcomes,  there  is no guarantee  that  the  public sector  can do  any better.  For
another, different persons will disagree on the extent to which redistributive goals
are important,  and on the extent to which governments can succeed in achieving
them.  Since redistribution is one of the key functions of government, this leads to
disagreements over the role of govermnent in the economy.
From a normative perspective, the role of government can be seen as facilitating
the  maximization of some notion of social welfare.  The appropriate form of the
social welfare function is not something which need concern us as long as we agree
on some general features of it.  The main such feature is that it is some aggregate
of individuai utility levels. As such, it conforms with individual preferences, and
also it satisfies the Pareto principle. 2 The way in which individual utility levels are
aggregated involves a value judgment which is resolved in the political arena. The
aggregation can involve differing  degrees of tolerance for inequality of utility lt vels,
referred to as inequality aversion in the literature.  The degree of inequality aversion
displayed by political decision makers is relevant both for the extent of government
intervention  in the economy and for the desired degree of decentralization.  This
will become apparent below.
Looking at  the role of government from a social welfare perspective leads to
identifying  two general reasons for intervention,  which correspond to  two types
2  A social welfare function  which  ranks  alternatives  solely on the  basis of the utilities  achieved
by individuals  in the society  is referred to  as a  w,elfar.i  tic social  welfare function.  It  rules  out
non-utility  aspects  of different  social  states  such  as freedom  of speech  and  religion,  justice,
and  so  on  (except  as  they  are  reflected  in  utility  levels.  The  Pareto  principle  says  simply
that  if at  least  one  person's  utility  rises  due  to  some  change  in  the  economy  and  no  one's
falls,  then  social  welfare rises.  There  is a  vast  literature  on  social  welfare  functions.  For  a
non-technical  exposition,  see Boadway  and  Bruce  (1984).
4of market  failure.  In  turn,  these  two  types  of  market  failure  correspond  to  two
conceptually  different  steps  involved in  reaching  the  highest  level of social  welfare
entails  . The first is ensuring  that  the economy is operating  on its  utility possibilities
frontier,  that  is,  that  it is operating  with  economic efficiency. This  requires  seeing
that  gains from trade  are exploited  to the fullest extent  possible consistent  with the
resources,  technology  and  constrain,  3 facing society.  The  constraints  involve both
institutional  and informational  constraints  as we shall see below.  This  is referred  to
as the  efficiency objective  of economic policy.  The second is ensuring  that  the 'best'
point  on the utility  possibility frontier  is collectively chosen, that  is, the point which
yields  the  nighest  level of social  welfare.  This  is the  equity objective  of economic
policy.  The  outcome  generated  by a market  economy  will generally  fail to  satisfy
both  the  efficiency and  the equity  objectives  of policy;  hence,  a  potentia:  role for
government.3
It  will be  useful  for  e  ir  subsequent  discussion  of the  assignment  problem  to
mention  briefly  some  of the  more  prominent  sources  of inefficiency  and  inequity
in  the  market  economy.  These  market  failures  will be  the  ultimate  source  of the
normative  rationale  for government  intervention.  We consider efficieaicy  failures and
equity  failures  in  turn.  We can  be  brief since most  of these items  are  well known
from  the  public  economics literature.
a.  Sources  of Inefficiency  in the Market  Economy
i.  Public  Goods.  Public  goods  are those  characterized  by jointness  of conrnump-
tion,  and,  in some cases, by non-excludability.  Because of the free rider  prob-
lem, markets  cannot  be relied on to  provide efficient amounts  of public  goods.
Though  this  is the standard  rationale  for government  intervention  in the  liter-
ature,  very little  of government  expenditures  are on public  goods.  Recognition
of this  is important  for  the  assignment  problem  since much  of the  literature
on fiscal federalism  has  also focused  on the  provision  of public  goods.  Public
goods may also be limited  either  by geographical  proximity,  in which case they
are referred  to  as local public  goods, or  by congestion,  in  which cPse they  are
club goods.  Both of these cases of public goods are relevant  for the assignment
of functions.
3 These  failures  are related to the failure  of the so-called  two fundamental  theorems  of welfare
economics  which  summarize  the strengths of the competitive  market mechanism.  The first
of these theorems states that, in a certain set of idealized  circumstances,  the market, if
operating competitively,  will yield an efficient  outcome;  that is, it will yield  a point on the
utility possibility  frontier. The second  states that any Pareto optimal  allocation  of resources
can be achieved  by a competitive  market mechanism  combined  with a suitable  redistribution
of initial wealth among  households.
5ii.  Externclities.  These are special cases of the joint  consumption property  in
which private economic  agents undertake activities which have benefits or costs
for others without  being priced.  Governments may respond by assuming re-
sponsibility for their provision,  or by using corrective mechanisms such as taxes
(subsidies) or quantity regulations.  Since many externalities are limited geo-
graphicaily, decentralization of their control to lower levels of governmen  id a
possibility.
iii.  Economies of Scale. The minimum cost output  for a good or service may be
large relative to the market being served, in which case competition will not
prevail. Private provision would result in an inefficiently  low level of provision
and the existence of positive profits.  Governments may undertake to provide
the  good or service themselves in an effort to attain  a more efficient level of
output.  Or, they may regulate private pro'*sion by stipulating  prices or rate.-
of return  that  can be earned.
iv.  Unemployed  Resources. Problems of coordination on some markets such as la-
bor and capital may cause resources to be unemployed. There is some  literature
indicating  that  these inefficiencies  may be mitigated by government policies,
such as unemployment insurance or macroeconomic policies, though  there is
considerable disagreement about  the effectiveness  of government policies for
these purposes. Nonetheless, most governments tend to engage in them.
v.  Absence of  Markets.  In some cases, markets for engaging in  certain  types
of trades  simply do not  exist  . A good example of this  is  the  market  for
risk.  Markets may simply be too thin to trade away all possible diversifiable
risks.  On the other hand, it may be that  some forms of risk are induced by
government action -tself. For example, the absence of efficient private markets
in unemployment insurance may be a result of the fact that  the  event being
insured against, i.e., unemployment, may be at least partly urder  the control
of tae government.
vi.  Imperfect Information. Markets may be inefficient  because of asymmetric infor-
mation problems. The two most comraon forms are moral hazard and adverse
selection. Moral hazard refers to a situation in which one side of the market
can take actions that affect the market outcome, but that  cannot be observed
by the other  side.  Market outcomes will then involve a non-opt:mal amount
of such actions. Adverse selection occurs when participants on one side of the
market  differ from one another  in some characteristic that  is not  observable
to the other side. Such markets are known to yield inefficient outcomes, and
perhaps even to  preclude equilibrium outcomes.  These p.oblems can  occur
in a wide variety of markets, including labor, capital,  durable products,  and
6services such as insuranct.  The gtneral  consensus in the  literature  is that  in
most cases, governments have little or no informational advantage over private
sector participants and therefore can do little  to improve on the inefflcienacy  of
private markets.  Given this, the governmen! may be no more efficient at pro-
viding such things as health insurance and unemployment compensation than
the private  sector.  We have to lOOK  at equity a-gurnents for the  widespread
tendency for these things to he provided by the pub'ic sector.
b.  Sources of Inequity in the Market Economy
i.  Unequal Incor-.es. The most obvious manifestation  of inequity in  a  market
economy is inequality in the distribution  of incomes.  These differences arise
from many different sources including natural  abilities, inheritances,  accumu-
lated  human capital, work effort and luck in the market  place.  Virtually  all
economies attempt  to redress income inequalities by redistributive policies of
various sorts.  both  through money transfers  and  through  in-k;nd  transfers.
Apart from the desired amount of redistribution being a matter of value judg-
ment, redistribution based on income is of limited usefulness in achieving equity
objectives.  For one thing,  income is a rather  imperfect measure of economic
well-being since, for example, it does not reflect non-market sources of utility
such as leisure and household production. For anothei, income for tax purposes
can be readily varied by households by varying their behavior or by conceal-
ment.  The main message to be taken from the extensive theoretical literature
on the optimal income tax is that redistribution by income levels is a relatively
limited  policy instrument  which needs to  be supplemented by other  instru-
ments, such as targeted in-kind transfers (e.g., housing, food stamps) and the
provision of universal public services such as education.
ii.  Social Insurance. In fact, there are differences  other than  the  ability to earn
income that  are at  least as important  sources of inequali y in  utility  levels,
and that  can be, and are, used as bases for iedistributive poL.ies.  Examples
include health status,  emplr  ment status,  location of residence, and date  of
birth.  The characteristics possessed by each person is largely a matter of luck
at birth.  Redistribution based on these features is sometimes referred  to as
social insurance. If persons could purchase insurance against  being unlucky
in  these  characteristics, they would.  They obviously cannot  do  so because
insurance  could only be purchased after  the  event being  insured  against  is
revealed. Thus, they can only be 'insured' after the fact by the public sector.
This  might be viewed as the prime justification for public health insurance,
unemployment insurance, assistance to the disabled, intergenerational transfers
in favor of unlucky cohorts, and so on.
7The recognition that  there is a limiit  to the extent of redistribution that  can be
achieved through the income-based tax-transfer system, and that  a substantial pa. t
of actual  redistribution  is achieved through the provision of services in kind  and
social insurance based on other personal characteristics, has important implications
for an appreciation of the role of government and of the assignment of functions.
For one thing, it helps explain why most studies of the incidence of taxes tend to
show that  they are only mildly redistributive even based orn  imperfect measures such
as income.  For another, it leads one to recognize that  much of what governments
actually do is redistributive in nature if not in intent. The implication of this for the
division of powers then depends upoII  one's view about  what level of government
should be responsible for redistributive meastures. We return  to this issue below.
Our discussion so far ielies on normative arguments about  the role of goverli-
ment.  Diffelent persons will have very different views about  how closely actual
governments come to being social welfare maximizers, or even take equity into ac-
count at all. Moreover,  governments are observed to do i -any sorts of things which
are hard  to justify on normative grounds, including regulatory activities, the sub-
sidization and  protection of certain activities and  the  provision of certain  goods
and services which the private sector could provide more efficiently. Thus, far from
being the  social welfare maximizers of normative public economics, governments
may be contrclled by self-interested bureaucrats or vote-maximizing politicians wit
relatively little  interest in  social welfare.  In fact,  there  is an entire spectrum  of
possibilities ranging from the  fully benevolent government to  the  purely selfish.
The point  on the spectrum  chosen depends jointly on the preferences people ex-
press through their voting behavior and on how well political decisions take voters'
preferences into account. Some well-known  points on the spectrum are as follows.
ii.  Ethical Voting. It might be argued that people vote according to their etbical
preferences. For example, it is well known that,  from a purely private point of
view, the act of voting is itself irrational.  One way to explain voting behavior
is with the notion that  it is done without self-interest in mind.  To the extent
that  governments actually behave according to voters' preferences, this would
entail that looking at them ab social welfare  maximizers has an element of truth
to it.  This sort of explanation would be consistent with the seemingly massive
redistribution  programs actually observed in the modern welfare state,  which
are difficult to explain solely in terms of vote maximization or the self interest
o; bureaucrats.
ii.  Altruistic Preferences. A milder  form of equity is obtained by assuming that,
though  persons vote selfishly rather  than ethically, their  preferences include
altruism  toward the leEs well off.  This would give rise to  an exploitation  of
8Pareto-improving  transfers.  It  is not  likely to  account  for  the extent  of redis-
tribution  observed  in practice.
ii.  The  Selfish  Voter.  If voters  are purely  selfish, a  political  system  which  obeys
voters'  preferences  will redistribute  towards  the decisive voters,  such as the me-
dian  voter.  Most models of voting would suggest  that  this  would involve some
redistribution  towards  the  mean  or lower mean,  and  would be  consistent  with
some  of what  is observed.  It  would  -till  have difficulty explaining  redistribu-
tion  towards  the least  well off persons,  who are also often  the  least  influential
politically.
ii.  Pressure  Group  Influence.  The  political  system  may  respond  less  to  voters'
preferences  than  to those of pressure  groups and  special interests.  This  is likely
to give rise both  to policies favoring these groups  and  to wasteful  rent-seeking
behavior  as new groups are induced to form.  It  is more likely to explain  special
forms  of  treatment  of well-defined groups  than  broadly  based  redistributive
policies.
ii.  The  Leviathan.  At the  extreme  end  of the spectrum  is the  government  which
acts  purely  in  its  owll interest  relatively  unconstrained  by  the  voters.  It  is
usually  thought  to be interested  in maximizing  its own size.  To the extent  that
this  is true,  i~ will have consequences for the assignment  of powers in the sense
that  greater  decentralization  may reduce the ability of governments  to increase
their  size wastefully.
One's view of the proper  assignment  of powers will be influenced very  much by
the weight one puts  both  on equity considerations  (i.e., one's aversion to inequality)
and  on one's  view of the extent  to which governments  act  in  the  social interest  as
opposed  to their  own interest.  These will differ from observer  to observer.  As well,
the conditions  will differ systematically  across countries.  Thus, our discussion of the
assignment  of powers cannot  give definitive answers to precisely  how decentralized
public  decision  making  should  be.  Nonetheless,  the  case for  decentralization  is
suggestive and  persuasive enough  to be able to make qualitative  judgments  in many
cases.
2.  Efficiency  and  Equity  in  a  Federal  Economy
Ultimately  the  assignment  of powers and  the  optimal  policies  undertaken  by each
level  of  government  depend  upon  the  same  efficiency and  equity  considerations
that  determine  the  rationale  for government  intervention  in  the  first  place.  How-
ever, there  are many efficiency and  equity considerations  that  are special  to federal
9economies. Let us consider these in turn.
a. Efficiency Considerations in a Federal  Econ.my
The achievement of efficiency  in  a market  economy involves outputs  being pro-
duced with the least required inputs (technical efficiency), exchanges being made
by all consumers at the same relative prices (exchange efficiency), costs being min-
imized by all producers at the  same relative input  prices (production efficiency),
and consumers and producers facing the same set of relative prices in all markets
(overall efficiency). A decentralized competitive market economy  goes a long way to
achieving economic efficiency. Government intervention on efficiency  grounds may
be required to provide public goods, internalize externalities, ensure resources are
fully employed, supplement missing markets and deal with the consequences  of scale
economies. In a federal economy, in which there are internal political boundaries
and in which geographical differences  exist, there are various other dimensions of
economic efficiency  which are important.  A list of the more important  of these is
as follows.
i.  The Intei nal Common Market. This involves the unimpeded flow of all goods,
services, labor and capital across political borders within the country.  There
should be no barriers to movement imposed by governments within the federa-
tion, whether by taxes and subsidies, by regulation, by preferential procurement
policies or by the design of local public goods and services.  Of course, there
may be natural  costs to trade  such as transportation  costs, language, and so
on. We are concerned instead with government imposed barriers.  The absence
of these will ensure that  resources are all',cated efficiently  within the federa-
tion.  In a federation in which decision making is decentralized, violations of
the efficiency  in the internal common market may be imposed by lower level
governments either wittingly or unwittingly. In the former case, governments
may use policies like taxes, subsidies and regulations to improve local condi-
tions at the expense of non-residents. This is referred to as interjurisdictional
competition.  If all jurisdictions engage in it,  the  result may be that  all are
worse off, akin to the outcome of tariff wars between countries. On the other
hand, distortions may arise simply because countries adopt differing  policies in
an uncoordinated fashion. There may also be benefits from lower  levels of gov-
ernment competing with one another. There is a body of literature associated
with public choice economists which takes the view that  competition between
governments is a good thing since it induces more efficient local government
decision making, reduces the size of government and ensures that  local gov-
ernments act in the best interests of their residents. This may be used as an
argument for decentralizatio.i.
10ii.  Local Public  Goods and Ezternalities.  The  traditional  argument  for public
intervention in the economy is the provision of public goods and services. By
the same token, the traditional argument for the decentralization of functions
to lower  levels of government  is the fact that some public services are of a purely
local or regional nature.  Efficiency  in a federation requires that  the level of local
public goods in each locality be determined by the benefits of the residents being
served. Residents of different localities will generally prefer different levels of
provision. A decentralized federation has the benefit that each local government
is able to provide the type and mix of public services that  its local residents
prefer.  Furthermore, if residents are relatively mobile, they should be free to
move to the jurisdiction which best caters to their preferences. The so-called
Tiebout model has stressed the  benefits of free migration ('voting with one's
feet')  combined with  decentralized decision making in a federation in  which
some public goods are of a local nature and persons have different preferences.
We have stressed that not all of government expenditures are for public goods.
Governments also provide many quasi-private goods. Similar arguments about
the benefits of catering to the tastes of local residents can be made in the case
of these types of public expenditures. As well,  some regulations may be local in
nature.  For example, governments may use regulations to protect local culture
or languages. In these cases, culture or language may be viewed as local public
goods.
iii.  Interjurisdictional Spillovers. In practice, the beneficiaries  of local public ex-
penditures may not coincide with the residents of the locality undertaking the
expenditure.  Residents of neighboring jurisdictions may benefit from (or be
harmed by) policies of a given jurisdiction. There are said to be interjurisdic-
tional spillovers. Since local governments will have no incentive to take account
of the spillover benefits they generate for non-residents, local decision making
may be inefficient. Intergenerational spillovers  can be analyzed in a way analo-
gous to externalities in the private sector involving individual decision makers
such as households  or firms. As is well  known  from that literature, the spillovers
can be 'internalized' in a variety of ways, including direct negotiation among
the parties involved, taxation or subsidization by a higher authority, and reg-
ulation by a higher authority.  In the context of fiscal federalism, the parties
involved are lower levels of government and the higher authority is a higher
level of government.
iv.  Fiscal Efficiency.  In a federation, the decentralized decision making of lower
levels of government itself can give rise to  a particular  form of inefficiency,
referred to in the literature  as fiscal inefficiency. The problem arises because
different governments at  a given level are typically able to provide different
11net fiscal  benefits  (NFBs)  to  their  residents,  where  by  NFB  is  meant  differ-
ences  between  the  value of public  services and  their  tax  cost.  The  existence
of differences in NFBs  across jurisdictions  means  that  the  benefits  of residing
in  one  jurisdiction  relative  to  another  include  not  only  the  relative  earnings
differentials  between  the two states,  but  also the  differences in NFBs  between
them.  To the  extent  that  persons  are  mobile  across  states,  they  will allocate
inefficiently since  they  will equate  the  sum  of earnings  plus  NFB  in  the  two
states  (net  of any costs of moving)  while economic efficiency involves equating
only earnings  net of moving costs.
There  are three  main sources of NFB differentials  in a federation.4 The first is
a fiscal externality  that  arises in an economy with local public goods.5 It results
from  the  fact  that  persons  entering  a local jurisdiction  do not  take account  of
the  fact  that  they  jointly  consume  the  local  public  good  with  other  persons
in  the  locality  and  reduce  the  tax  burden  to  them  from  financing  the  public
good.  Though  this  has figured prominently  in the literature,  it is probably  not
of great  importance  in practice,  partly  because  the  phenomenon  is not  likely
to  be quantitatively  significant,  and  partly  because most  local services are not
truly  'public'  in  nature.  A  more  important  difference  in  NFBs  arises  from
differences  in  access  to  source-based  tax  bases,  especially  taxes  on  resource
rents.  A locality which has  the larger  such tax  base can provide public services
at  lower tax  rates  than  other  localities.  The  third  source  of NFB  differences
results  from the redistribution  inherent  in lower level government  budgets.  For
example,  suppose  lower  governments  provide  public  services  which  are  like
private  goods in equal  per  caoita  amounts  to  all residents.  Suppose  also  that
they  finance  these  public  expenditures  by  a  proportional  income  tax  on  all
residents.  Then,  the  budget  has  an  overall redistributive  effect.  High income
persons  obtain  a negative  NFB,  while low income  persons  obtain  a  positive
NFB.  However, if  one  compares  across  jurisdictions,  persons  in  low average
income localities will have systematically  lower NFBs than  those in high average
income  localities,  and  the  NFB  differential  will be  the  same  for  persons  of
different  income  classes.
v.  Tax Harmonization.  Lower level governments  will generally  have some  inde-
pendence  in  raising their  own tax  revenues.  Assuming  that  this  is done  in  an
uncoordinated  fashion, inefficiencies will typically  arise because  tax distortions
4  For a  more  detailed  discussion  of these  sources  of NFB  differentials  and  their  relevance  for
policy, see Boadway  and  Flatters  (1982)  and  Wildasin  (1986).
5  The notion  of a fiscal externality  was first  discussed  in detail  in Buchanan  and  Goetz  (1972)
and  analyzed  in detail  in Flatters,  Henderson  and  Mieszkowski (1974).  The circumstances  in
which  local  government  tax  policies  are likely to give rise  to fiscal externalities  are discussed
in Boadway  and  Wildasin  (1984).
12differ across jurisdictions.  This can be a result of differential  tax rates on capital
or labor  income  which results  in  a  misallocation  of these  factors  across juris-
dictions,  or different  tax  rates  on the  sale or production  of goods  and  services
which  will distort  production  patterns  across jurisdictions.  The  magnitude  of
the distortions  will depend  upon the mobility  of the tax base.  Thus,  differential
tax  rates on mobile tax bases like capital  will be more distorting  than  those  on
tax  bases  like real  property.  These  sorts  of distortions  in a federation  will be
mitigated  to  the extent  that  tax  systems  are chosen in a harmonized  manner.
The  harmonization  can  take  the  form  of coordination  among  lower levels  of
government,  or it can take  the form of a higher level of government  participat-
ing  in  the  setting  of tax  policy  for lower levels of government  in  a  variety  of
ways.  Participation  can include  centralized  administration  of tax  collection,  a
centrally  defined tax base or even a common rate  structure.  The lower level of
government  may  be  limited  to  setting  the level of taxes,  or to  choosing  local
credits  and exemptions,  or to defining the entire  tax structure.  The local levels
may or may not  be involved in the  tax policy  chosen for the entire  federation.
The  harmonization  of  taxes  improves  the  efficiency of the  internal  common
market  by reducing  the  collection  and  compliance  costs  both  for the  private
sector  and for the tax authorities,  by reducing  the possibility of double or non-
taxation  of income  earned  by firms  operating  in  more  than  one jurisdiction,
and  by reducing  the possibilities  for evasion and avoidance through  such things
as  transfer  pricing  and  financial  transactions  designed  to  reallocate  tax  bases
to  low-tax jurisdictions.  It  reduces  the  potential  for wasteful  tax  competition
among  jurisdictions.  The  benefits  of tax  harmonization  of the  corporate  tax
base  may come about  to some  extent  without  any formal  agreement  to  do so.
That  is, competitive  pressure  may induce a certain amount  of similarity  among
provincial  corporate  tax  bases.  t  the  same time,  similarity  of tax  bases is not
sufficient to ensure efficiency. Tax competition  may take the form of beggar-thy-
neighbor  tax policies designed to attract  factors of production  from neighboring
jurisdictions.  If all jurisdictions  engage  in  it,  the  result  may  be  similar  tax
structures,  but inefficiently low tax rates and public services.  From an efficiency
point  of view, it can be argued  that  harmonization  is most important  for taxes
which  impinge  upon  capital  income,  less important  for taxes  which are levied
according  to  residency,  such  as  labor  income  taxes  and  indirect  taxes,  and
least  important  for taxes  on real  property.  This  means  harmonization  is less
important  in the indirect  tax  system  than  in  the direct  tax system.  The main
problems  concern  the inability  to enforce  the  residency  provisions  of the  tax.
These  can be circumvented  by shopping  across local borders.  Given that  there
are no border  controls, it is not  obvious that  anything  can be done about  this.
In  fact,  because  of  the  absence  of border  controls,  there  will be  competitive
13pressures for keeping sales tax rates and structures relatively similar. This will
be important  for our discussion of the assignment of taxes to jurisdictions.
vi.  Ezpenditure Harmonization.  There may also be some efficiency advantages
from harmonizing public services delivered by local governments. Differences
in the design of these programs could affect migration among jurisdictions. For
example, the services offered to the poor may induce the in-migration of low-
income persons.  This possibility could induce local jurisdictions to engage in
a sort of wasteful expenditure competition whose aim was to attract  desirable
residents and repel less desirable ones, which could only be self-defeating  in the
aggregate.  As well, some expenditure programs give rise to  spillover benefits
to residents of other jurisdictions who can take advantage of the services being
provided. An example in industrialized countries is higher education. Residents
of one state province may attend  the universities of another state or province,
thereby  benefiting from expenditures done by the  government of the  latter.
Transportation  facilities are another example, as are health services. Finally,
expenditure harmonization may be important  vertically between government
programs at different levels. Some programs will inevitably have some overlap
and  harmonization will avoid costly duplication of effort.  Examples might
include regional  development programs undertaken by two  levels of government,
or labor training and education programs.
These examples of inefficiency  in a federation have an influenze on the assign-
ment  of responsibilities to  different levels of government.  They also give rise to
arguments for intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in which higher levels of gov-
ernment retain some influence, if only via financial leverage, over the decentralized
actions of lower  levels of government. The same might be said for sources of inequity
in a federation to which we now turn.
b.  Equity Considerations  in a Federal  Economy
Just  as decentralized decision making in a federation gives rise to  possible ineffi-
ciencies, so it also gives rise to inequities. In addressing the sources of inequities it
is useful to make reference to  the distinction that  public finance economists have
traditionally  made between horizontal equity and vertical equity. The principle of
horizontal equity says that  persons who are equally well off in the absence of gov-
ernment ought also to be equally as well off in its presence. It is thus a principle of
equal treatment  of equals. It is this notion of equity which turns out to be impor-
tant  in the  design of federal fiscal systems.  Vertical equity is concerned with the
appropriate  amount of redistribution from the  better  off to  the less well off. The
extent of redistributive policies to achieve  vertical equity will depend upon both the
14constraints  on redistributive  instruments  as well as society's  aversion to  inequality.
This  distinction  between  horizontal  and  vertical  equity  has  been important  in the
literature  on fiscal federalism.
In a federal  state,  the issue of equity  introduces  two main  additional  consider-
ations  that  would not exist in a unitary  state.  One concerns  vertical  equity  and  the
other  horizontal  equity.  Consider  them  in turn.
vi.  Vertical Equity  in  a Federal State.  With  more  than  one  level  of government,
the  achievement  of  vertical equity  becomes  more  complicated.  A major  issue
becomes  which  level  of government  is responsible  for  vertical  equity.  Those
who  use  normative  arguments  to  argue  in  favor  of  centralized  responsibility
do  so on  the  grounds  that  society's  social  welfare function  ought  to  inc' ide
all  persons  in  the  federation  on  a  symmetric  footing.  In  judging  how much
to  redistribute  from  the  better  off to  the less well off, it  should  not  matter  in
which locality  the persons  reside.  They  would  also  argue  that  decentralizing
responsibility  for equity would result in a form of interjn.risdictional  competition
which  would result  in  too  little  redistribution.  Each  jurisdiction  would  have
an  incentive  not  to  pursue  redistribution,  since it  would tend  to  attract  lower
income  persons to  the jurisdiction  and discourage  high income  persons.  Those
who  favor  some  redistributive  responsibilities  for lower  levels of government
argue that  there  are distinctly  local preferences for the extent  of redistribution;
some localities  have a lower aversion to inequality  than  others.  This is typically
used  as an argument  for lower level governments  sharing  the  responsibility  for
redistribution  with higher  levels rather  than  taking  it on exclusively.
Economists  who take  a more  public  choice oriented  view of the  way govern-
ments behave often argue for decentralizing  the redistributive  function  for other
reasons.  They see governments  as engaging in too much redistribution  because
of the way in which collective decisions are Liken.  Decentralizing  the  distribu-
tive function  introduces  interjurisdiLtional  competition  and  effectively reduces
the  amount  of redistribution  that  occurs.  (Indeed,  they  apply  the  same  argu-
ment  to  other  functions  of government  as well as  the  redistributive  one.  For
example,  those  who adopt  the Leviathan  perspective  believe  that  government
must  be constrained  from becoming too  large and  inefficient; decentralizing  its
functions  in  a federal  system  is one way to  accomplish  that.)  More generally,
economists  who do not  put  a strong  emphasis  on redistribution  tend  to  favor
more decentralization  of the redistributive  function.
Of course,  assigning  responsibility  for  equity  to  one  level  of  government  or
another  is not  a feasible option.  Governments  at all levels cannot  avoid having
an  impact  on  the  distribution  of well-being  since  virtually  everything  they
15do will affect different groups differently.  That  is true for expenditures,  for
revenues, and for regulation. Thus, constraining different levels of government
from undertaking  redistributive fuinctions must be done either  by assigning
functions appropriately, or by allowing  one level of government to influence  the
decisions taken by the other  by regulation or financial incentive.  This tiirns
out  to  be an important  part  of the way in  which federal economies actually
operate.
vi.  Horizontal Equity in a Federal State.  One of the most important  considera-
tions in designing  a set of federal fiscal arrangements involves horizontal equity.
In a federation with decentrali 'd  fiscal responsibilities, horizontal inequity is
almost inevitable unless corrected explicitly.  In the federalism context, it is
referred to  as fiscal equity, a  term that  goes back to Buchanan  (1950).  It is
simply the notion of horizontal equity applied in a federal setting and is anal-
ogous to  the  concept of fiscal efficiency discussed above.  As we have seen,
in a decentralized federation, different jurisdictions provide different NFBs to
their residents. These NFB differentials  come about from differences  in source-
based tax  revenues (e.g., resource, property  and corporate  taxes),  and from
the  redistributive component of local government budgets operating through
residence-based taxes.  There may also be NFB differentials arising from dif-
ferences in the cost and need for public services across localities. For example,
localities with a higher proportion of children will need proportionately greater
expenditures on education.  This means that  otherwise identical persons will
be treated  differently by the government sector, specifically by the local gov-
ernments.  In other words, the actions of local public sectors if left to determine
their their own expenditure levels using their own revenue sources will violate
the principle of horizontal equity in a federation.
As we shall see, the existence of NFB differentials  forms the main argument for
a system of equalizing grants from higher levels of government to lower levels.
The importance of such grants becomes greater the more decentralized is the
federation.  The argument for the use of grants to eliminate NFB differentials
has a unique property. Since the existence of NFB differentials in a federation
reflects both fiscal inefficiencies  and fiscal inequities, their elimination is called
for on both  efficiency  and equity grounds.  It is one of those rare instances in
economics where efficiency  and equity considerations do not conflict.
3.  The  Assignment  of Functions  in a  Federal  System
The  notion of an ideal assignment of functions is an evasive one since so much
depends upon  institutional  considerations, value judgments  and  empirical conse-
16quences  that  are  hard  to  verify.  The  ambiguity  arises  from  a  number  of factors.
The  political  and  social structure  of the country  might  be  such as to  preclude  the
desired  amount  of decentralization.  For example,  countries  with  unstable  regions
may  be  reluctant  to  decentralize  ecoaomic  responsibilities  for fear of inducing  po-
litical  instability.  The extent  of decentralizatioii  one favnrs also depends  upon  how
one  assesses  the  size of the  role  that  should  be  taken  on  by  government  in  the
economy.  Typically  speaking,  those  who wish to impose  constraints  on the  size of
government  will likely  want  more  rather  than  less decentralization.  The  relative
role of central  and  lower levels of government  will also be influenced  by the  degree
to  which  governments  are relied  upon  to  redistribute  income.  Those  who  stress
the  redistributive  role of government  will generally  favor  more centralization  than
those  who wish to  restrain  government  redistributive  activities.  Finally,  the  bene-
fits  of decentralization  will depend  upon  the responsiveness  of economic activity  to
lower level government  decision making,  that  is, the extent  to  which state  govern-
ment  policies  influence  the level of economic activity  attracted  to  the state.  That
remains  an  unanswered  empirical  question.
We are not  able to resolve these issues since they  depend  either  on value judg-
ments  or on  unverified  hypotheses  about  government  behavior.  The  best  we can
do  is to  outline  the  sorts  of considerations  that  need  to  be  taken  into  account  in
deciding  on the assignment  of functions.  Ultimately,  these amount  to applying  the
notions  of equity  and  efficiency to a federal  setting.
One useful  perspective  to  take on the assignment  of functions  to  higher versus
lower levels of government  involves drawing  a parallel  between  the role of markets
versus  that  of the government.  Economists  typically  argue in favor of decentralized
market  solutions  unless they can be shown to fail demonstrably.  This is because  of
the  well-known  efficiency advantages  of decentralized  competitive  decision making.
The onus for government  intervention  is put  squarely  on the shoulders  of those  who
argue  for it.  In  the  case of federal  economies,  it  can similarly  be  argued  that  de-
centralizing  functions  to lower levels of government  should  be favored unless sound
arguments  can be  advanced  for centralized  economic power.  In our  view, this  is a
useful  methodological  rule  to  adopt,  and  one  we shall  follow.  The  advantages  of
decentralized  decision making  in a federation  should  be clear  from  our subsequent
discussion.  The  case for centralization  will then  follo;,  from observing  the  circum-
stances  under  which decentralized  public  sector decision making  leads unavoidably
to inefficiencies and  inequities  in the federation.  Even in these  circumstances,  cen-
tralization  need  not  entail  exclusive  responsibility  for  a  particular  area  of policy
making.  A key  message of this  paper  is the inefficiencies and  inequities  that  may
accompany  decentralization  can often be  addressed  with  central  government  poli-
cies which are not  so intrusive  as to displace decentralized  decision making  and  the
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Our  subsequent discussion will ignore a potentially  important  issue for the
assignment of powers in developing countries: the transition from one federal fiscal
system to another.  As we shall see, it will typically be the case that decision making
is relatively centralized in  developing countries compared with  the ideal.  There
may be various historical and political reasons for this.  One of the implications
of this is that  the institutions for assuming expenditure and taxing responsibilities
at  a lower level are either  non-existent or not  very highly developed.  This  may
apply either to the decision making institutions or to the administrative and service
delivery institutions.  The absence of such institutions implies that  there would be
a  certain transition  cost involved in decentralizing fiscal functions to lower levels
of government.  This transition  cost would have to  be set against the  benefits of
decentralization in each case; but, transition costs ought not to be used as the sole
reason for avoiding decentralization, with all the longer term benefits that it entails.
The previous sections dealt with the efficiency  and equity roles of government
in a market economy, and with the special sorts of efficiency  and equity consider-
ations which arise in federal economies. To put the assignment of powers issue in
perspective, it is useful first to present the arguments for and against decentraliza-
tion of responsibilities in a federation, both on the expenditure and on the tax side.
Given the high degree of centralization of powers currently in existence in develop-
ing countries, this is a natural  perspective to adopt.  We will then look at the roles
of higher versus lower levels of government in general terms,  and finally consider
what this implies for specific functions. We shall see that,  since expenditure func-
tions and tax functions can be decided independently, it will generally be the case
that  the preferred tax assignment will not generate precisely the right amount  of
revenue to finance the expenditure assignment. This gives rise to the possibility of
intergovernmental transfers, a topic which is taken up in the subsequent section.
In what follows,  our discussion  will be couched in terms of a federation with two
levels of government. The higher level will be referred to as the federal government,
and the lower level as the state government. In practice, all federations consist of a
number of different levels of government, including federal, state,  regional, county,
municipal, and even some special interest jurisdictions.  The principles developed
here can be readily extended to them.
a.  The Pros and Cons of Decentralizing  Expenditure Responsibilities
There are  a variety of well-established arguments for decentralizing some of the
functions of government to lower levels. The main ones are as follows.
18i.  Local Public Goods and Services. Public goods and services, those whob  i ser-
vices are simultaneously consumed  by a large number of persons, vary according
to the geographical  extent of the benefits they deliver. At one extreme are na-
tional public goods, such as defense, foreign affairs and control of the money
supply. These are natural candidates for centralized provision. However,  other
public goods and services provide collective benefits to a localized population.
Though they  could be provided to  the  various regions by  a central author-
ity, decentralization is favored for a couple of reasons. For one, the preferred
amount and type of them depends upon the tastes and needs of local residents,
and local governments are in a better position to match their provision with lo-
cal preferences.  As well, lower  level provision  is likely to be less costly because
administrative overheads are likely  to be lower, because agency and monitoring
costs are likely to  be lower, and because local jurisdictions are likely to face
some competitive pressures from neighboring jurisdictions due to the mobility
of resources across state boundaries.
ii.  Quasi-Private Goods and Services.  Few of the goods and  services provided
through  the  public sector are public ones; most are  quasi-private in  nature
(e.g., schools, roads, hospitals).  Given that,  the actual delivery of them will
be done through local institutions  regardless of which level of government is
responsible for their provision. As with local pubic goods, the main beneficiaries
of locally delivered quasi-private goods are residents in  the locality involved.
Decentralization to  the  states  should allow the  services to  be provided in  a
way which best caters to local tastes.  State  delivery should be more efficient
because higher level administrative overheads and monitoring costs are avoided.
Efficient provision and innovation should also result because of an element of
competition induced among state levels of government.  On the  other  hand,
despite the  benefits of decentralizing the  provision of quasi-private goods to
the  state  government, it may be useful for the federal government to retain
an oversight role if there are  advantages to  harmonization.  For example, if
residents are mobile, harmonization may be beneficial in order to ensure that
labor mobility is not impeded by the lack of portability and to guard against
wasteful competition among states.
iii.  Local Preferences for Redistribution. Preferences for redistribution  may vary
from one locality to another.  Some localities may have more aversion to in-
equality than others.  Or, some may prefer the use of certain types of in-kind
transfers rather than cash transfers. This would suggest some decentralization
of the  provision of goods and services which are  primarily redistributive in
nature.  It might also support some state responsibility for the extent of redis-
tribution  accomplished  through the tax-transfer system. As with quasi-private
19goods, decentralization of redistribution instruments runs the risk of introduc-
ing distortions into the internal common market as well as wasteful and futile
interjurisdictional tax or expenditure competition.
iv. Fiscal and Political Accountability. The decentralization of responsibilities may
induce more fiscal responsibility or accountability as well  as political accountability
into the federation. The provision is at a level of government which is 'closer' to the
people served, and the government faces the discipline of persons leaving a juAs-
diction which behaves irresponsibly. Interjurisdictional competition can be healthy
and efficiency-enhancing,  just like inter-firm competition in the private sector. The
argument for fiscal responsibility is especially valid to the extent that  states  must
finance their expenditures out of own source revenues. It can be used as a argument
for decentralizing the responsibility for raising the requisite amount to finance state
public expenditures, at least at the margin.
At the same time, there are certain disadvantages to decentralization, or equiv-
alently, advantages to  centralization of expenditure responsibilities.  Some of the
more important  ones are as follows.
i.  Interjurisdictional Spillovers. Public goods and services provided in one local-
ity may generate benefits for the residents of neighboring localities. If left to
their own, jurisdictions would systematically underprovide those goods which
have positive spillovers (and overprovide those with negative spillovers). The
goods or services generating the spillover  benefits may actually be quasi-private
ones where the benefits spillover as a result of cross-border movements of per-
sons or  capital.  Centralizing the  provision is one way of internalizing the
externalities.  Of course, centralization of provision may not  be required to
take account of this.  The federal government can influence the  provision of
spillover-generating activities of state governments in other ways as well, such
as by regulation or conditional grants.  In fact, if the local governments could
negotiate  among themselves in the manner of a Coasian bargaining solution,
federal intervention may not be necessary at all.
ii.  Economies of Scale, As in the private sector, scale economies  provide an argu-
ment for provision by larger units of government. This would  be the case where
administrative overheads are large.  It is not clear that  this argument  applies
to the assignment of functions between the federal level of government and the
states;  in most countries, states  would probably be large enough to  exhaust
economies of scale. It is presumably more important between the states  and
their municipalities.
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be important  to ensure an efficient allocation of resources across states.  For
example, portability of pensions, absence of residency requirements for housing
and welfare services, and standardized education or trade qualifications make
it easier for persons to move from one state to another. As well, harmonization
may reduce the  ability of states  to engage in  wasteful 'beggar-thy-neighbor'
policies by using expenditures selectively to attract  desirable types of factors,
or repel undesirable types (e.g., persons who use a lot of public services for
whatever reason).  Again, .he centralized provision of the services may not be
uecessary to  achieve harmonization; the use of conditional grants to  maintain
national -Landards is often sufficient.
iv.  Federal Equity Responsibilities.  A substantial  proportion of expenditures by
governments are intended  to  achieve redistributive objectives.  This inc!udes
not only transfers, but also spending on quasi-private goods and services, and
social insurance schemes. To the extent that  the federal government has an
interest in, and a responsibility for, equity across the nation,  it will have an
interest in the structure and extesit of such programs. Indeed, this is likely to
be one of the most important  rationales for federal government intervention.
Again,  it is not  clear that  the exercise of federal responsibility in  this  area
requires federal provision. Indeed, one of the underlying themes of this paper
is that  the federal government can achieve many of its equity objectives in a
federal system in which most services  are delivered  locally,  but where the federal
government uses its financial and regulatory power to influence the design of
state programs.
The choice of the  degree of centralization versus decentralization on  the ex-
penditure  side, and the precise means by which central governments achieve their
desired influence, will vary from expenditure type to expenditure type.  It will in-
volve a  trade-off between the  benefits of decentralization, which include catering
to local preferences, the ability to provide services at low cost, and creating incen-
tives to innovate, against the benefits of centralization, which include maintenance
of the internal  common market, achievement of national equity, internalization of
inter-state  spillovers and the  provision of national public goods and services.  As
mentioned, different observers will have different views about the ideal balance.
b.  The Pros and Cons of Decentralizing Taxation Responsibilities
Similar issues arise on the revenue side of the budget. Although the decentralization
of expenditure  responsibilities implies an argument for decentralizing tax respon-
sibilities as well, the  exact  extent  of decentralization can, in principle,  be done
21ii:dependently of the assignment of expenditure functions. There are various ways
in  which tax decentralization can occur.  One is by assigning particular  tax  bases
excclusively  to lower levels of government and allowing  them to decide how much to
excploit  them.  This form of decentralization entails not only local decision making
but  also local administration  and collection of the  tax.  However, lesser forms of
decentralization are possible without necessarily compromising accountability. For
example, tax  bases and their revenues can be assigned to lower levels of govern-
ment, but their administration can be done centrally. Or, tax bases may be jointly
occupied by state and federal governments. This allows for varying degrees of de-
centralized decision making and harmorization.  The federal government may be
responsible for administration and tax collection for itself and the states, and may
be responsible for cetern.ing  the bFse and possibly the rate structure.  The states
could then simply determine tile 'evel of taxes collected by applying their own tax
rate to the federal tax liability. This is sometimes referred to as piggy-backing  and
combines the best featurt.  if harmonization with some degree of accountability for
revenues raised in each.  state.  More decentralized systems would involve the states
being able to set their own rate structures or even their own bases. In the limit, the
two levels of government may simply co-occupy the same base but set their own tax
structures independently as they see fit.  Lven in this extreme case, some minimal
degree of harmonization across states is needed to ensure that  the same source of
income is not double taxed in more than one state.  This can be accomplished by
rules for the allocation of tax bases to states.
Decentralization of taxing powers is desired mainly in order to induce political
accountability into the federation.  As well, local jurisdictions may have particular
preferences for certain features of the tax  system, such as the  degree of progres-
sivity or the set of tax  preferences to use.  However, as with  the decentralization
of expenditures, the decentralization of tax responsibilities can give rise to various
inefficiencies  and inequities. Inefficiencies  arise for two main reasons. Both involve
distorting the allocation of mobile factors across states and therefore reducing the
efficiency  of the internal common market.  This car  arise simply because different
states  choose individually to levy different tax rates on factors of production which
are highly mobile.  Factors will tend naturally  to locate inefficiently  in  the  state
with the lowest tax  rates.  Since capital is highly mobile, this would suggest that
state taxes on capital within their jurisdictions are potentially highly distortionary.
Given this, tax competition may result in considerable uniformity of tax rates
across jurisdictions.  Even so, tax  competition can itself result  in a non-optimal
situation.  States will recognize  the mobility of factors such as capital, and will have
an incentive to  engage in  beggar-thy-neighbor tax  competition  to  attract  them.
The end  result  may well be uniformity of tax  rates  but  at  too low a level from
22the  collective  point  of view of the  states.  These  sorts  of distortions  will be  less
for  taxes  levied  on  less  mobile  factors  of production  such  as  real  property.  In
most  federations,  persons  will be much less mobile among jurisdictions  that  capital,
though  more  so than  real property  and  resources.  Thus,  taxes  on  persons,  such
as labor  income  taxes,  income taxes  based  on residency, or  general  sales taxes  will
impose  less efficiency costs than  those  on capital.
Yet  another  sort  of inefficiency caused  by  the  decentralization  of tax  respon-
sibilities  concerns  what  we have  referred  to  as fiscal inefficiency.  This  arises  from
differences  in  NFBs  across states,  one  important  source  of which  is differences  in
fiscal capacity.  Different  tax  capacities  will result  in  lower NFBs  in  poorer  states
relative  to  richer  ones,  and  will induce  too  many  factors  to  locate  in  the  latter,
resulting  in  inefficiency.  As we shall argue  later,  a way out  of this  problem  which
is consistent  with  decentralized  tax  responsibilities  would involve corrective  action
by the federal  government  in the  form of equalizing  grants  among  states.
The  decentralization  of  taxation  responsibilities  will  also  generally  result  in
inequities  from  a  national  point  of view.  For one  thing,  differing degrees  of pro-
gressivity  will imply  that,  say, higher income per ,ons will face different  tax burdens
depending  on their state  of residence.  From a national  point of view this will be hor-
izontally  inequitable.  There will thus be a trade  off between the benefits of allowing
state  governments  to implement  their  own local  preferences  for redistribution  and
nationwide  horizontal  eauity.
Even in the absence of state  differences in redistributive  policies, the decentral-
ization  of taxing  responsibilities  will generally  give rise  to fiscal inequities,  which
we have defined above to  be a form of horizontal  inequity  in a federation.  Persons
who reside in states  with higher fiscal capacities  will receive higher NFBs from their
state  government.  This  will result  in  fiscal inequity.  As  with  fiscal inefficiency,
the  remedy  can involve a  system  of federal  grants  which  do not  compromise  the
ability  to  decentralize  tax responsibilities.  As we shall see, one of the key functions
of grants  in  a federation  is precisely  to compensate  for differences in  NFBs  across
states.
More  generally,  the  nature  of the  decentralization  of revenue  raising  respon-
sibilities  will  depend  upon  the  role  of the  federal  government  in  addressing  the
problem  of redistributive  equity.  If one views equity  as being largely  a federal  re-
sponsibility,  that  entails  that  those  taxes  which  are  best  suited  for redistribution
should  be  centrally  controfled.  These  include  direct  taxes  on households  such  as
income  and  wealth  taxes.  Centralized  control  need not  imply  exclusive  federal  ju-
risdiction;  state  government  piggy-backing  on federal  direct  taxes  can be done with
the  federal  government  retaining  control  of the  rate  structure.  Since transfers  to
23persons are equivalent to negative direct taxes,  the  structure  of the latter  might
also be controlled by the federal government. The role of the federal government
in the tax-transfer system becomes particularly important  in a federation in which
the  provision of public services are highly decentralized to  the  states,  given our
view that  public services are essentially instruments  or redistribution.  If the fed-
eral government is to retain some influence  over national equity objectives, it must
have the instruments with which to achieve these objectives. The less control they
have over the provision of public services, the more they will need to rely on other
instruments for redistributive purposes. Control of direct taxes and transfers is one
such instrument; the use of conditional grants is another.
To summarize, while fiscal responsibility dictates that responsibilities for taxa-
tion be decentralized to allow state governments the ability to finance at least some
of their own expenditures, this decentralization leads unavoidably to inequities and
inefficiencies. The magnitude of these is greater  the higher the  degree of decen-
tralization.  The solution to  this may partly lie in  retaining some control of the
tax  structure  in  the  hands of the  federal government.  This will induce greater
harmonization of the tax system among federal and state gcvernments thereby con-
tributing  to the efficiency  of the national economy and reducing the  costs of tax
collection. It will also facilitate the federal government's pursuit of its redistributive
objectives through the tax system.
On the other hand, the federal government can undo some of the inefficiencies
and inequities of decentralized tax systems through its use of grants to the states.
This  will be particularly  true  for inefficiencies  and  inequities arising from NFB
differentials across states.
c.  The Overall Roles of Central and State Governments
These considerations of the benefits and costs of decentralization lead to a general
prescription of the sorts of roles that  the federal government might be best suited
for, and those that should be left to the states.  We first outline what these general
roles might be, before turning to what they imply for the assignment of more specific
functions.  Our discussion concentrates on outlining the general responsibilities of
the federal government, that is, considering the extent to which varioi:s roles should
be centralized. take is that of the federal government. The logic of this approach is
dictated by the reasoning indicated above where we argued that,  in the absence of
a specific argument for centralization, decentralized responsibilities should be the
rule.
In general terms, the presumption is that  the federal government must assume
24responsibility for national efficiency  objectives, which include the efficient  function-
ing of the internal common market, the prov-ion  of national public goods and the
internalization  of spillovers  within the federation as well as dealing with other na-
tions.  The caveats to this general rule are that  some of these objectives could be
handled by interstate  negotiation and  agreement, or that  the states  might share
responsibility with the federal government for some of these efficiency  goals, such as
those concerning interstate spillovers. Perhaps more controversial is the role of the
federal government in pursuing national equity objectives. It is controversial to the
extent that different observers might put different weights on equity as an objective
per se.  To the extent that equity is accepted to be a legitimate objective of govern-
ment, the federal government can be assumed to  be interested in both  horizontal
equity across the  nation and vertical equity across income groups.  We elaborate
on what is entailed by these general roles in a bit more detail in this subsection,
beginning with national equity.
i.  The Federal Responsibility  for  Equity.  The standard  argument for assigning
the  federal government primary responsibility for equity is that  all persons
ought  to be treated  the same regardless of where they reside in  the nation,
and  only the  federal government can assure that.  As well, assigning equity
to  the  federal government reduces the opportunity  for state  governments to
engage in self-defeating interjurisdictional  competition which would prevent
equity goals from being achieved in a decentralized federation.  On the other
hand, those who would down play the federal role in equity matters in favor of
the  states do so either on the grounds that  equity is unimportant  or that  the
federal government will grcvv  too large if it is given such responsibilities. They
see decentralization as being a constraint on the  size of government.  There
might also be a case for some state role in redistribution to satisfy purely local
redistributive concerns.
Whatever one's views about  the  assignment of the equity function, it is not
at all clear how equity can be assigned in practice to one level of government
or  the other.  Virtually everything that  governments do has a redistributive
component.  This esp cially applies to  the  sorts of public services that  one
might like to see decentralized on efficiency  grounds.  It seems inevitable that
some joint responsibility for equity will be the norm.  Those who feel strongly
that national equity considerations should be addressed would  argue it must be
the case that  the federal government has the instruments on hand to address
such concerns in a manner which is consistent with whatever decentralization
of expenditure responsibilities is agreed upon.  As should become clear below,
one way to satisfy this is to ensure that  the federal government can use grants
to the states for equity purposes.
25ii.  National  Public  Goods and Interjurisdictional  Spilloverl.  These  are  perhaps
the  least  disputable  sources of centralization  of economic powers,  but  perhaps
also  the  least  significant in  terms  of actual  budgetary  importance.  There  are
various  ways in which the federal government  may exercise its jurisdiction  so as
to ensure  that  the benefits of national  public goods  and spillovers are properly
accounted  for.  One way is by federal government  provision.  This  is the obvious
solution  for national  public goods such as defense, foreign affairs, the control  of
the  money  supply, criminal  law, and  so on However, there  may  be advantages
from  an efficiency point  of view to decentralizing  to  the states  the provision  of
public services, whose beneficiaries are mainly state  residents  but  some of whose
benefits  also transcend  state  borders.  In this  case, the federal  government  can
still induce the states to take account of spillover benefits without  sacrificing the
benefits  of decentralization  by providing grants  to the states  in support  of such
expenditures,  but  with  conditions  attached.  The  grants  may be  block grants
with  fairly  general  conditions  setting  out  national  standards,  or  they  may  be
more specific in their  conditions.  The more detailed  the accountability  to the
federal government  that is required,  the less will the benefits of decentralization
be realized.  The grants  may also be of a matching  nature  in order  to induce the
states  to  provide enough  expenditures  on such goods.  In some  circumstances,
federal  financial  intervention  may  not  be  necessary.  It  may  be  sufficient  for
the  federal  government  to  impose  regulations  on  state  government  behavior,
such  as  regulations  which  preclude  state  decisions  from  interfering  with  the
efficiency of the  internal  common  market.  The  problem  with  this  alternative
is that  it  too  can detract  from  the  benefits  of decentralization,  one  of which
is to  induce  responsible  and  unconstrained  decision making  by lower levels of
government.
iii.  Provision  of  Quasi-Private  Goods.  A substantial  proportion  of government
spending  is on  quasi-private  goods provided  on  a virtually  free basis.  Exam-
ples include  education,  health  care, and  local services.  As mentioned  above, a
strong  case might  be made for decentralizing  the  provision  of these goods  and
services to  state  governments  on the  grounds  that  this  will improve  efficiency
and  accountability  as well as  the  matching  of local  preferences.  At  the  same
time,  the federal government  may have an interest  in both  the level of provision
and  the  type  of services provided  for national  efficiency and  equity  reasons..
State  provision  may be inefficient because of interstate  competition  in  services
designed  to  attract  desirable  residents.  Also,  there  may  be  spillover  effects
associated  with  the use of state  public  services of this  type.  Residents  of one
state  may  be  able  to  obtain  the  benefits  of services provided  by neighboring
states  by temporary  or permanent  movement  between  states.  States  may dis-
count  the benefits  obtained  by non-residents  and provide too  low a level.  More
26generally,  the efficiency of the internal  common  market  may be compromised  if
differences in public service provision  preclude  the free movement of resources
among states.
As  well as  having  an  interest  in  the  effect  that  state-provided  quasi-private
goods and  services have on national  efficiency, the federal government  may also
have an interest  in the equity properties  of them.  As we have stated  repeatedly,
many  quasi-private  goods  can  be  seen  as devices  for  achieving  redistributive
goals  delivered  through  the  expenditure  side of the  public  sector  budget.  To
the extent  that  the federal  government  has  an interest  in  equity,  it  will have
an  interest  in seeing that  some common  standards  of equity  are adhered  to in
the  delivery of services.  Thus,  even though  efficiency might  dictate  that  quasi-
private  goods and  services be provided  by the states,  it may  be desirable  that
the  federal  government  retain  the  ability  to  influence  the  way in  which  that
authority  is exercised.  Once again, the system  of grants  may be an appropriate
policy instrument  for doing so.
iv.  Regulating  the Internal  Common  Market.  An important  efficiency objective
of the  federal  government  will be  to  facilitate  the  free and  non-distorted  flow
of private  sector goods, services, capital  and  labor  within  the common  market
of the federal  economy.  Decentralizing  responsibilities  to  state  governments  is
likely to interfere with this objective.  There will be a tension between the rights
of the  states  to  undertake  their  policies  as  they  see fit,  and  the  desire of the
federal  government  to see that  they  do not  exercise those rights  in a way which
distort  unduly  the workings of the internal  common market.  The desire to pre-
serve the internal  common market  suggests various things  about  the assignment
of powers.  An important  potential  source of distortionary  government  decision
making  involves the regulatory  power.  Governments  commonly  impose  regu-
lations  in markets  for goods and  services (such  as agriculture,  transportation
and  commixunications),  in labor  markets  and in capital  markets.  In many  cases,
these regulatory  powers are used for protective  purposes  rather  than  as a  way
of improving  the  efficiency or equity  of the  market  economy.  Decentralizing
regulatory  functions is almost  certain  to interfere  with  the  efficiency of the in-
ternal  common market  and for that  reason should  be avoided.  A case also can
be  made  more generally for the federal  government  (or the  courts)  being  able
to  override  state  regulations  which  distort  the  internal  common  market.  This
might  apply  not  only to state  regulations  but  also to  state  taxes and  subsidies
and  other  expenditure  policies.
v.  Tax Assignment  and Harmonization.  The  general  arguments  in  favor  of de-
centralization  apply  with  much greater  force on the  expenditure  side  than  on
27the  tax  side of the  budget.  There  are obvious  administrative  and  compliance
economies from having a single large Wax  collecting authority.  As well, the cen-
tralization  of tax policy facilitates  the achievement  of equity  objectives  by the
federal  government.  Moreover,  decentralizing  tax  powers leads  to  inefficien-
cies in  the  internal  common  market  both  because  of the  possible  distortions
imposed  by state  tax  policies on  the allocation  of resources  across  states,  but
also because  of the fiscal inefficiency that  arises in a decentralized  system  when
different  states  have different  tax  capacities.  These factors  have implications
for the assignment  of taxes to levels of government  as well as for the role of the
federal  government  in coordinating  tax  policies of loWer levels of government.
In  terms  of assignment,  the  more  'mobile'  the  base,  the  stronger  is the  case
for centralization.  Also, for equity  purposes,  federal  control  over direct  taxes
is important  since these  are  the  taxes  best  designed  to  address  equity  issues.
It  should  be emphasized  that  the advantages  of centralization  of tax  collection
and  tax  policies  need not  entail  that  certain  taxes  be  assigned  exclusively  to
the  federal  government.  There  can  be tax  sharing  arrangements  which  com-
bine federal  collection  and  administration  as well as federal  control  of the  tax
structure  with  state  responsibility  for setting  its  own rate  level.  Nonetheless,
for effective federal  control,  a  sufficiently large share  of the  tax  room  must  be
retained  by thn  federal  government.  The upshot  is likely to  be  a situation  in
which the revenue raising capacity  of the federal government  is greater  than its
expenditure  responsibilities,  and  vice versa  for the  states.  That  is,  there  will
be  a fiscal  gap.  Not  only is  this  fiscal gap  a  natural  consequence  of the  fact
that  the  case for decentralization  is stronger  on the expenditure  side than  the
tax  side  of the  budget,  but  also  the fiscal gap is a desirable  feature  of federal
systems  to the extent  that  federal-state  grants  have a useful role to fulfill. That
role is discussed  further  below.
iv.  Transfers  and Social Insurance.  Along with  the provision  of public  goods  and
services  and  the  provision  of quasi-private  goods  and  services,  transfers  pay-
ments  to  persons  and  businesses  comprise  most  of government  expenditures
(especially  in industrialized  countries).  Some of these  transfers  are  for redis-
tributive  purposes  in the  ordinary  sense, and  some are for industrial  policy or
regional  development  purposes.  Some are also for redistribution  in  the social
insurance  sense, such as unemployment  insurance,  health  insurance  and  public
pensions.  Several factors bear on the assignment  of responsibility  for transfers.
In  the  case of transfers  to  business,  many economists  vwould  argue  that  they
should  not be used in the first place.  But, given that  they are, they are likely to
be more distortionary  if used at the state  level than  at the federal  level.  This is
because  the objective of the subsidies is typically to increase  capital  investment
by firms,  which  is mobile  across  states.  As for transfers  to  individuals,  since
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the extent  to which the federal level of government assumes primary responsi-
bility for equity.  From an economic point of view, transfers are just  negative
direct taxes.  One can argue that  transfers should be controlled by the same
level of government that  controls direct taxes so that  they can be integrated
for eqaity purposes and harmonized across the nation for efficiency  purposes.
The case for integration at the central level is enhanced when one recognizes
the several types of transfers that  may exist to address different dimensions of
equity or social insurance.  There is an advantage of coordinating unemploy-
ment insurance with the income tax system or pensions with payments to the
poor.  Decentralizing transfers to the states will likely lead to inefficiencies  in
the internal  common market, fiscal inequities and interjurisdictional  beggar-
thy-neighbor policies.
To summarize, the role of the federal government relative to state governments
is predicated on the provision  of national public goods and services, the maintenance
of the  efficiency of the internal common market and the pursuit  of redistributive
equity nationwide.  The importance of the latter  determines to a great extent  the
degree of centralization of the federation. Equity objectives influence the role that
the federal government should assume in the direct tax  system and the system of
transfers.  They  also have a bearing on the  federal government's interest in  the
provision of quasi-private goods and services, many of which serve a redistributive
function.  And, the  federal government's interest in  equity affects its  use of the
federal-state transfer system to influence  the way in which state governments behave
and to redistribute resources among states in an equalizing manner. In other words,
the extent of the role of the federal government is largely determined by its interest
or lack of interest in redistributive matters.
d.  Features of the Optimal Assignment of Responsibilities
We have stressed that  the search for an ideal assignment of economic functions to
different levels of government is bound to be in vain because different persons are
likely to come to different judgments about  such things as the way in which gov-
ernments behave, the importance of competition among governments, the empirical
effects of government policies  on the allocation of resources and the importance of
equity as a role of government. Nonetheless,  on the basis of the above discussion of
the advantages of centralization versus decentralizationi,  certain broad prescriptions
might be made about  which functions shouild  be decentralized. We outline here a
view of the assignment of powers which we think would obtain the consensus of a
broad spectruim of economists despite the jud(lgmnents  involved.
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lization  policies, for addressing  national redistributive  equity objectives,  for ensuring
the optimal  provision  of public goods and services whose benefits transcend  borders,
and  for the  maintenance  of an efflicient and  smoothly-functioning  internal  common
market  in goods and services, labor  and capital.  The equity  objective  includes  both
horizontal  and  vertical  equity.  Economic responsibilities  should  be decentralized  to
the  states  to  the  greatest  extent  possible  consistent  with  these  national  economic
objectives.  The states  should be responsible for the provision  of goods and  services
of a local  or state  nature,  that  is, those  whose beneficiaries  are mainly  within  state
borders.  They  might  also share  some responsibility  for redistribution  with  the fed-
eral  government.  The reason  for this  is partly  because  states  might  have differing
views about  the  ideal  amount  of redistribution  within  their  jurisdictions,  but  also
because  many  of the  fiscal  actions  of the  states  will have  unavoidable  effects on
equity,  especially  those  arising from their  expenditures.
From  these  general  principles  follows a  preferred  assignment  of expenditure
responsibilities.  The  states  would be responsible for the delivery  of public  services
which  are of a quasi-private  nature,  including  health  care and  insurance,  education
in  all  forms  (including  post-secondary  and  manpower  training),  welfare  services,
family and  child support  services, state  transportation  and communication  services,
local utilities  and municipal  services, and resource management  (including  local land
management  and environmental  issues).  The federal government,  on the other  hand,
would be responsible for expenditures  of a clearly national  nature,  including  defense,
foreign  affairs,  international  trade,  immigration,  etc.  For  stabilization  purposes,
the  federal  government  should  assume  responsibility  for  the  central  bank  and  the
currency.  Following these  principles  would result  in  an  assignment  of expenditure
responsibilities  for goods and  services provided  through  the public  sector  which  is
relatively  decentralized.
At the  same  time,  the federal government  maintains  an interest  in the  way in
which the  states  exercise  their  expenditure  responsibilities.  For example,  there  are
consequences  for national  efficiency and  equity  from  the  way in  which  the  states
design  their  expenditure  programs.  In the case of education,  equity  objectives  may
imply  that  equal  opportunity  and  accessibility are important  objectives.  Efficiency
might  suggest  some  harmonization  of curriculum  standards  and  portability  from
one  state  to  another.  Similar  arguments  can  be  rnade to  favor  accessibility  and
portability  of health  carc as well as some more or less comnprehelnsive  definition of the
types  of services  covered by puiblic health  care expenditures.  These objectives  can
be  achieved while maintaining  the integrity of local delivery  by federal  intervention
in  the form of conditional  grants  to  the states.  This is referred  to as the  use of the
spending  power.  If the  spen(lirng p)ower  is used wisely. the benefits  of decentralized
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to  ensure  that  national  equity  and  efficiency objectives  are  met.  This  requires  an
exercise  of the  spending  power which is not  too  obtrusive  and  overbearing  of state
decision makers and  which requires  only a minimal  amount  of accountability.  In the
absence  of the spending  power,  complete  decentralization  of the  provision  of public
goods and  services to  the state  level could lead to wasteful expenditure  competition
and  to substandard  levels of efficiency and equity.
To ensure  a smoothly-functioning  common market,  responsibility  for those  reg-
ulatory  functions  which  have effects crossing  state  borders  should  reside  with  the
federal  government.  These  functions  include  the  regulation  of  international  and
interstate  trade  in  both  goods  and  services  (including  such  things  as  agriculture,
communications  and  transportation),  environmental  and resource  use issues involv-
ing  more  than  one  state,  and  capital  markets.  The  assignment  of labor  market
regulation,  including  professional  and  trade  licensing  and  employment  practices,
should  also  be  at  the  federal  level  to  maintain  undistorted  labor  mobility  in  the
internal  common  market.  At the same time,  given that  labor  market  circumstances
differ from  state  to  state,  there  might  be  some role for  state  participation  in  the
regulation  of labor  markets,  provided  that  such regulation  is not  used in a discrim-
inatory  or  disLortionary  way.  One  the  other  hand,  the  case for  assigning  to  the
federal  government  any role that  may exist in regulating  markets  for capital,  goods
and  services  is  strong.  In  contrast  to  the  case of public  sector  expenditures.  the
assignment  of regulatory  responsibilities  would be  quite  centralized.
It  may  be  that  the  most  effective  way to  exercise  these  regulatory  responsi-
bilities  is through  quasi-independent  regulatory  bodies,  which may  well have  state
representation.  Even so, the  federal  government  must  maintain  effective responsi-
bility  even if they  choose to  exercise it  using  such bodies.  By the  same token,  for
some types  of expenditures,  it may be sensible to form special purpose  bodies whose
role is to deliver a particular  type  of public service.  This  may be the case for public
services  whose optimal  delivery  level is between  existing  levels of government,  or
those  for  which  user  fees or  benefit  taxes  are the  appropriate  mode  of financing.
Examples  of such  bodies  include  local school boards,  conservation  or environmen-
tal  authorities,  and  transportation  or communications  bodies.  They  may be  given
varying  degrees of autonomy  when it comes to  raising  revenues and  delivering  ser-
vices,  and  they  may  have  varying  degrees  of political  accountability.  They  may
represent  a means of decentralizing  economic decision  making  without  decentraliz-
ing political  authority  and  inducing  political  instability.  The point  is that  one need
not  necessarily  feel bound  by the existing  set  of political  jurisdictions.
The  assignment  of tax  responsibilities  can be  determined  somewhat  indepen-
31dently  of the  assignment  of expenditures,  though  accountability  arguments  can  be
used to  limit  that  independence.  The income  tax  system  should  be under  the  con-
trol  of the  federal  government,  though  there  is no reason  why the  states  could not
co-occupy  the field.  Federal dominance  assists in  the fulfillment  of the objectives  of
national  equity since the income tax is one of the main instruments  that  can be used
for redistributive  purposes.  Federal  control  of the  income  tax also serves to ensure
that  it  will be harmonized  across  the nation  so that  administrative  and  compliance
costs are minimized  and resource  allocations  across states  are not  distorted  by state
tax  provisions.  It  might  also  assist  in  the  management  of macroeconomic  policy
objectives.
Other  direct  taxes often used include  capital  taxes, taxes on wealth  and wealth
transfers  (including  bequests  and  inheritances),  resource  taxes, real  property  taxes
and  payroll  taxes.  A strong  case can  be made  for ensuring  central  contro'  of the
first  two  of these.  In the  case of capital  taxes  and  taxes  on  wealth,  inheritances
and  bequests,  mobility  considerations  are paramount.  State  taxation  of capital  will
either  be  ineffective  because  of  tax  competition  among  states,  or  it  will lead  to
distortions  in the  allocation  of capital.  Similarly, states  are likely to compete  away
taxes  on wealth,  inheritances  and  bequests  thereby  reducing  their  effectiveness.
Resource taxes  are an  interesting  case since arguments  can exist for both  cen-
tralization  and  decentralization.  The  problem  with  decentralizing  them  is not  so
much one  of mobility,  but  of the  fact  that  resources  tend  to be  distributed  highly
unevenly  among  states.  From  an  equity  point  of view,  one  can  argue  that  prop-
erty  rights  to  the  bounty  of natural  resource  endowments  ought  to  rest  with  the
national  government  to be shared  among all citizens.  Giving  the states  the right  to
tax  resource  rents  leads  to  differential  NFBs  across states  with  the resultant  fiscal
inefficiencies and inequities  that  we have discussed earlier.  Thus, a case can be made
for federal  assignment  of the  collection  of resource  rents  for those  resources  which
are  of significant  size and  which  are  unevenly  disbursed  among  states.  Common
examples  include  oil and  gas  properties  and  significant  mineral  deposits.  At  the
same time,  a case can be made for retaining  state  control over the  collection of pro-
duction  taxes  or royalties  for other  types  of resources.  Those  of lesser importance
such as small mines and  quarries  might  be good sources of revenues for states.  The
same  might  be  said  for timber  properties.  In  the  case of resources,  an  additional
consideration  arises  and that  is the  role of the government  in managing,  developing
(includiiig  providing  infrastructure)  and  conserving  the  resource.  These  are often
functions  whose primary  benefit  accrues  to state  residents.  To the extent  that  state
tax and  royalty  systems  are useful for these regulatory  purposes,  decentralizing  re-
sponsibility  for  them  would  be  a  good  thing.  If needed,  the  federal  government
could  always  provide  general  incentives  over resource  usage  by its  spending  power
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sidered  on  a  case by  case basis.  Since resources  are immobile,  resource  revenues
are good candidates  for state  taxation.  Centralization  becomes more important  the
more  significant  the  value of the  resource  and  the  more unequally  is it distributed
among  states.  Even  if states  assume  responsibility  for resource  taxation,  there  is
still the  option  open  to the federal  government  to correct  for  nequal  distributions
by equalizing  grants  to the states.
The  fourth  of the  above direct  taxes,  the real  property  tax,  is generally  taken
to  be  aD ideal  tax  to  assign  to  lower  levels  of government,  especially  municipal
governments,  given  their  immobile  nature.  The  states  can  serve  a  coordinating
and  administrative  function  by  assisting  in  the  property  evaluation  process  and
even  acting  as  a tax  collector.  At  the  same  time,  they  can  insure  that  different
municipalities  within their jurisdictions  which have different property  tax capacities
can  nonetheless  provide  comparable  levels of  services  to  their  citizens.  That  is,
the  states  can  eliminate  NFB  differences  within  their  borders  just  like the  federal
government  can across states.
Finally,  it  could  be suggested  that  the  federal  government  could  have  access
to  payroll  taxes  as well since they  are complementary  with  income  taxes.  On the
other  hand,  since these are not important  instruments  for equity, there  is no reason
for federal  dominance  in the field.  In fact, payroll  taxes  would make a good  source
of revenue  raising  for  the state  governments.  They  are  typically  single rate  taxes
applied  on labor  income  only.  As long as the rate  difference is not  too great  across
states,  they  are likely to cause little  inefficiency since labor is much less mobile than
capital.
As we have mentioned,  transfer  payments  to individuals  such as unemployment
insurance,  public pensions,  payments  to the poor and payments  for children,  should
be thought  of as negative direct  tax liabilities  and treated  symmetrically  with  direct
taxes.  This  means  they  too  should  be  available  to  the  federal  government.  The
delivery  of some of them  could be delegated  to the states  to improve administrative
efficiency and  accountability,  provided  the federal  government  retains  some  ability
to ensure  national  standards  of equity.
In the case of indirect  taxes,  the argument  for central control  is less compelling
than  it  is for  the  case of direct  taxes.  To  the extent  that  the  decentralization  of
revenue  raising capacity  is desired, indirect  taxes are good candidates  to be assigned
to  the  states.  In fact,  the design  of the indirect  tax system  itself depends  upon  the
extent  of decentralization  of taxes  to  the  states.  If the  general  sales  tax  is  to  be
assigned  to  the  states,  it may  be very  difficult administratively  to  operate  the  tax
on a multi-stage  basis, such as a VAT. The system of crediting  under  a VAT would
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taxes  paid on earlier stages of sales which cross state  borders.  With  the possibility  of
differential  state  tax rates  and  different  sets of exemptions,  this  becomes a difficult
task.  This  means  that  decentralization  of general  sales  taxation  to  the  states  may
call  for  a  set  of single  stage  retail  sales  taxes  in  each  state.  The  benefits  of  a
VAT in  terms  of administrative  and  economic  efficiency would  be  lost.  The  base
used  by states  would inevitably  be  narrower  than  is optimal,  and  the  well-known
problems  of evasion  and  the  inability  to  exempt  taxes  on  capital  purchases  and
exports  completely  would persist.  More generally, the states  would likely be forced
to adopt  a consumption  rather  than  an income basis for the tax (which  inay not  be
a drawback).  Also, the  ability  to enforce  the destination  basis would be limited  by
the  possibility  of cross-border  shopping.
The  converse of this  applies  as well.  If the general  sales tax  is centralized  to
the federal  government,  it  could  use a VAT and  reap all its  advantages.  However,
it would likely be precluded  from allowing the states  to participate  in the system  in
a way which  gives them  some discretion  over their  own rates  and  base.  A uniform
system  nation,  ide would be  much  preferred.  This  would  not  preclude  a form  of
revenue  sharing for the proceeds of the tax,  either  on the basis of where the revenues
were raised  or on some other basis.  Nor would it preclude  some form of joint  deter-
mination  of the  base  and  rates  by  the federal  and  state  governments.  Ultimately,
the  assignment  of the general  sales tax  boils down to how much tax  room  the  fed-
eral government  should  have relative  to  the states.  The more decentralized  are the
expenditure  responsibilities  to  the states  and  the more it is desired  to  decentralize
some  tax  authority  to  them,  the  more beneficial  it  would  be to  decentralize  sales
taxes  to  them  despite  the  disadvantages  of so doing.  Of course,  it is possible  that
separate  federal  and state sales taxes exist side by side in the same tax system.6 The
main  point  is that  it is more important  that  the federal government  have control  of
the income  tax than  of the  sales tax.
Selective excises, such as those  on  tobacco,  alcohol,  fuel, entertainment,  com-
munications  and  so on, could readily  be  decentralized  to  the states,  or co-occupied
by both  levels of government.  The  main  efficiency issue  concerns  the possibility  of
cross-border  shopping.  In practice  this  would  restrict  the  ability  of state  govern-
ments  to  set  widely  differing rates.  State  excise taxes  can  also  give ri  to  NFB
differences  to  the extent  that  different  states  have different  tax  capacities  for thcse
taxes.  If so, fiscal inequity  will result  which  the  federal  government  will need  to
address  with  its  grant  structure.
6  It should be noted that if the states operate indirect  taxes on a destination  basis, including
either general  sales taxes  or specific  excise  taxes,  these  taxes  should  be collected  at the border
on imports from other countries. Presumably  this is the task of the federal  government.
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general sales taxes and selective excises) and could have some access to direct taxes
on  residents (personal income and payroll taxes) jointly with  the federal govern-
ment.  The states  could also levy payroll taxes.  The federal government would
be responsible for resource taxes and taxes on capital income or wealth, with the
exception of the property  taxes.  Wealth transfer taxes would also be centralized.
Among these alternatives  virtually any realistic degree of decentralization of tax
capacity to  the  states  could be achieved.  This could be done by  a combination
of assignment of types of taxes and some tax  sharing.  User fees might also be a
source of revenues. This would be true mainly for the state governments and their
municipalities since the sorts of public services which are conducive to  allocation
by pricing are likely to be decentralized ones.
Despite the fact that  it is feasible to transfer as much tax  room to  the states
as one wishes, from an economic point of view, it  would also be desirable for tax
rates  to  be such that  the  federal government collects more tax  revenues than  it
needs for its own expenditure purposes.  This is partly a consequence of the fact
that  the  desired amount  of centralization of taxes exceeds that  of expenditures.
For  example, the  federal government needs a  large enough presence in  the  tax
field to be able to pursue effective  fiscal policy. As well, we have argued that  the
federal government should maintain enough dominance in direct taxes to be able
to  achieve tax  harmonization and national equity goals.  An excess of federal tax
collections over expenditure responsibilities also allows for transfers of funds from
the federal government to the states.  These transfers have their  own independent
role in a federal economy with decentralized fiscal responsibilities. The next section
summarizes the rationale and design of federal-state transfers.
4.  Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relations
Federal-state fiscal relations consist primarily of a set of financial transfers from the
federal government to  the states  and a set of arrangements for coordinating and
sharing particular  tax  bases.  There may also be interactions among governments
through regulations. In principle, the two levels of government could be financially
independent  and separate.  However, typically that  is not  the  case.  The federal
government will collect more tax revenues than it needs for its own purposes and
transfer some of them  to the  states either as grants or by the  explicit sharing of
tax  revenues. 7 This outcome reflects the  fact that,  while it  may be efficient to
decentralize expenditure responsibilities to a considerable extent, it is more efficient
7  The samec might  be  said for states  vis-d-vis their  municipalities.  We continue  the  convention
of using  the  federal  and  state  governrnents  to illustrate  the  principles.
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need for federal-state transfers in order to allow the federal government to  fulfill
its national efficiency  and equity objectives.  The purpose of this sub-section is to
review the principles involved in deciding the structure of intergovernmental fiscal
arrangements.
There are  some common properties  of intergovernmental fiscal instruments
which are worth summarizing at the outset.  Grants from the federal government to
the states may have a variety of properties.  They may be conditional or uncondi-
tionaL To be eligible for conditional grants, states  must use the funds in specified
ways. The conditions may be very general, iD the sense of being related to spending
in broad areas (e.g., education), or they may be specific and require a provincial
expenditure program to satisfy certain design features (e.g., a particular  highway).
The use of conditional grants constitutes one of the main ways in which the federal
government can influence the states to exercise their expenditure responsibilities in
a way which is consistent with national efficiency and equity objectives.  The full
amount of funds transferred for a particular  purpose may be contingent on state
expenditures fulfilling  certain conditions laid down by the federal government. The
conditions may be quite general (and, indeed, should be as unconstraining as is pos-
sible consistent with the objectives being addressed). Penalties for non-compliance
with the conditions may involve holding back part or all of the funds owing. Con-
ditional grants may be matching; that  is, their magnitude may be a proportion of
state  expenditures of a particular  sort.  They may be specific  or  block, where the
former refers to grants which must be used on a specific  sort of program (e.g., school
construction) and the latter is for a more generally defined area (e.g., edulcation).
Finally, they may be open-ended  or closed-ended. Open-ended conditional grants
are those  whose magnitude depends upon state  expenditures without  any upper
limit.
While the magnitude of conditional grants is related to expenditures of a given
sort by each recipient state,  unconditional grants  can be determined by a variety
of factors.  Two sorts of factors are relevant - those determining the allocation of
grants across states and those determining their growth rate over time. The simplest
allocation formula is an equal per capita grant, in which case population is the sole
determinant.  Other factors commonly used include average incomes, tax capacity
(i.e., the size of particular tax bases), tax effort, urbanization, age structure of the
population, and measures of the cost of providing particular state public services or
the relative need for state expenditures.  The rate of growth over time may be the
rate of growth of GDP, the rate of growth of state expenditures of particular sorts,
or other such indices of growth.
36Tax sharing formulas can also take a variety of forms. They can be highly cen-
tralized with the federal government determining the base and rate structure for a
particular tax source, collecting the tax, and turning over to the states a proportion
of the taxes collected. The revenues can be given to the states in accordance with
the state in which the tax was collected (the derivation principle) or other formulas
can be used,  similar to  those outlined above for unconditional grants.  Decisions
concerning the tax  structure of jointly occupied tax  bases can be decentralized in
a variety of ways. The states  may be able to choose a rate of tax  to apply to fed-
eral taxes payable, with the federal government retaining the rights to set the rate
structure  and base and to administer the tax.  Or the states may accept the base
used by the federal government and set its own rate structure,  including both  tax
credits and tax  brackets. The states may participate in the administration  of the
tax jointly with the federal government, especially the auditing of state  taxpayers.
At the  extreme, the states  and federal government may act independently to  set
their own tax  structures and collect their own taxes for the same tax.  Thus, the
spectrum  can go from fully harmonized joint taxes to  completely unharmonized
taxes.
One of the purposes of this subsection is to see what formulae for grants and
tax sharing arrangements follow  from the theoretical discussion of federal-provincial
fiscal arrangements.  We begin with a discussion of the role of federal-state grants
in theory, then turn briefly to a discussion of some characteristics of the optimal set
of fiscal arrangements in a federal economy.
a.  The Role of Federal-State  Transfers
We can identify five broad economic arguments for federal-state transfers each of
which is based on either efficiency  or equity, and each of which may apply to varying
degrees in actual federal economies. Each of them has been encountered above in
a different context.  They are the existence of a fiscal gap arising frcm the greater
degree of decentralization of expenditure responsibilities  than of the ability to raise
taxes, fiscal inequity resulting from differential NFBs across states, fiscal inefficiency
from the same source, interstate spillovers  of the benefits (or costs) of state policies,
and fiscal harmonization. We consider them in turn.
i.  The Fiscal Gap. An imbalance between the revenue-raising  ability of states and
their expenditure responsibilities might arise for two reasons. k'or one, it may
be more efficient for the federal government to collect tax revenues on behalf of
the states and turn the funds over to them to allow them to carry out their ex-
penditure  responsibilities. This avoids the tax competition and interstate  tax
distortions  that  might otherwise exist which would preclude the  states  from
37raising  the optimal  amount  of revenues on their  own.8 Competition  to  attract
capital,  business  activity  and  even labor  would induce  states  to raise too  little
revenues  relative  to what  would be efficient, and  to distort  the  interstate  allo-
cation  of resources.  The second argument  for a fiscal gap  is that  it essentially
arises  endogenously  within  the federation  owing to  the predominant  fiscal and
political  position  of the federal  government.  There  is a certain  amount  of tax
room available for the public sector as a whole.  The greater  the tax room  taken
by the federal  government,  the less there is available for the states.  The federal
government  may choose to occupy more tax room  than  it needs in order  to  be
able to undertake  a number of its fiscal responsibilities,  including  managing  the
macro-economy,  maintaining  a harmonized  tax  system,  and  making  the fiscal
transfers  that  it  needs  to  make  to  satisfy  the  objectives  of  such  transfers  to
which  we turn  next.
ii.  Fiscal  Inequity.  Fiscal  inequity  arises  when  citizens  in  two  different  states
within  a federation  are  treated  differently  by  the  fiscal system.  A federation
which  values  horizontal  equity  (i.e.,  the  equal  treatment  of  all  citizens  na-
tionwide)  will need  to  correct  the  fiscal inequity  which  naturally  arises  in  a
decentralized  federation.  As argued  earlier,  states  with  their  own expenditure
and  taxation  responsibilities  will be able  to provide  different  NFBs  to  citizens
within  their  jurisdictions.  These differences can arise  because  of differences  in
state  tax  capacities.  differences in  the  cost  of providing  state  public  services
and  differences  in  need for  particular  public  services  within  the  state.  In  a
centralized  federation,  they  would presumably  not  arise  because  the  federal
government  would provide comparable  services to all citizens  using  a national
tax  system.  Federal-state  grants  can eliminate  these differences in NFBs  if the
transfers  to  each  state  depend  upon  the  tax  capacity  of the  state  relative  to
others  and upon the relative need for and cost of providing state  public services.
The  need  for redistributive  federal-state  grants  will depend  upon  how decen-
tralized  the  tax  system  is, since differential  tax  capacity  is probably  the  most
important  source of fiscal inequity  (as well as being the one which is the easiest
to  measure).  Thus,  for example, if cost and  need differences  did not  exist,  and
if provincial  public  services were mainly  quasi-private  goods  provided  roughly
in  equal  amounts  to  all,  then  if the  tax  system  were completely  centralized,
equal  per  capita  grants  to  all  states  would  avoid  fiscal inequities.  As  more
of the  tax  system  is decentralized,  the  grants  would  have to  take  account  of
differential  tax  capacities  across  states.  More generally,  the  aim of equalizing
federal-state  transfers  is  to  replicate  the  financial  consequences  of  a  unitary
state  while at  the same time  allowing for the  considerable  advantages  of fiscal
8  In technical terms,  the  marginal  cost of public funds  is perceived  as being  much  higher  from
the  point  of view of the  states  than  it is for the federal  government.
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able potentially to provide comparable levels of public services at comparable
tax rates, without obliging them to act identically.
iii.  Fiscal  Inefficiency. The argument for eliminating NFBs with equalizing  federal-
state  transfers is reinforced by the fact that  the same NFB differentials which
give rise to fiscal inequity also cause fiscal inefficiency. Differences in NFBs
across states  give an incentive for persons to migrate to the state with higher
NFBs.  Since this differential does not reflect differences  in labor productivity,
this  fiscally-induced  migration causes an inefficient allocation of labor across
states,  with too many workers in high-NFB states.  As with fiscal inequity, this
can be avoided by equalizing transfers based on differences  in tax capacity.
iv.  Interstate Spillovers. This is the traditional argument for matching conditional
grants.  Interstate  spillovers  exist if the benefits from one state's expenditures
of a particular type accrue not only to that  state's residents but also the resi-
dents of one or more other states.  State governments will not have the proper
incentive to  provide the  correct levels of services which yield these spillover
benefits.  In deciding on service levels, the incentive for the state  is to weigh
the  costs of provision against  the benefits to  their  own residents, neglecting
the benefits to the residents of other states.  This will result in too low a level
of provision.  If these spillovers arise in  a reciprocal fashion from all states'
expenditures on these items, all states will provide too little, and all would be
better off if the provision were to increase. A system of matching federal-state
grants based on the expenditures giving rise to the spillovers will provide the
incentive to increase expenditures.  Typically, the extent  of the spillover will
be difficult to measure so the correct matching rate  to use will be somewhat
arbitrary.
v.  Fiscal Harmonization.  Harmonization of the  expenditure  programs  of the
states  may be important  for two reasons.  The first  has to  do with  main-
taining the efficiency  of the internal common market; the second with equity.
There is an advantage to the nation as a whole from harmonizing state public
expenditure programs since uniform expenditure programs will contribute to
the free flow of goods and services, labor and capital and will therefore improve
the gains from trade from the internal common market.  Such uniformity, as
well as portability, might be particularly useful in such areas as health, edu-
cation and  welfare as ways of encouraging the  unimpeded free flow of labor
among states.  Expenditure harmonization can be accomplished by the use of
con-litional grants.  In choosing such policies there  will always be a trade-off
between uniformity, which encourages the free flow of goods and factors, and
39decentralization which may encourage innovation, efficiency  and accountability.
Harmonization may also reduce the possibility of wasteful interstate  competi-
tion oni the  expenditure side.  Harmonization of state  expenditure programs
may also serve national equaity  objectives.  Many public services provided at
the state  level are redistributive in their intent,  providing in-kind redistribu-
tion to state residents. To the extent that the federal government is interested
in  redistribution  as a goal, there is a national interest in redistribution  that
occurs via the provision of public services. Since many of the programs that
incorporate in-kind redistribution may be provided at the state level, the federal
government may be restricted to influencing the design of these state programs
by conditional grants, where the conditions are intended to  achieve national
equity objectives.
b. Features of Federal-State  Fiscal Arrangements
As mentioned, the  set of federal-state fiscal relations comprise both  the transfers
of funds from the federal government to the states through conditional and uncon-
ditional grants as well as arrangements for sharing and harmonizing the raising of
revenues through taxation.  The form of the fiscal arrangements depends upon the
nature of the federation and the perceived roles of government at the various levels.
Some general principles are clear enough.
o  The first is that  the system of fiscal relations must be seen as a whole rather
than  as a set of unrelated parts.  The reason is that  each component tends
to contribute to more than one objective; equivalently,  each objective requires
more than one instrument.  Moreover,  some of the components are quite com-
plementary, and some have equivalent effects. For example, tax sharing agree-
ments  have similar financial effects to unconditional grants;  and,  equal per
capita  grants  financed out  of general revenues have an equalizing aspect  to
them.
* The second principle is that the sore decentralized the fiscal system is, the more
important  are the set of fiscel arrangements. We have taken the view that  the
decentralization of service provision in a federation is a valuable thing since it
increases the efficiency  and accountability with which services are delivered. By
the same token, some decentralization of revenue-raising must accompany ex-
penditure decentralization. However,  decentralization also brings the potential
for interfering with the efficiency  of the internal common market both through
the creation of interjurisdictional distortions and through beggar-thy-neighbor
policies, as well as causing inequities among members of different states.  The
creative design of fiscal relations can offset these induced inefficiencies  and in-
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provision.  In particular,  the  use  of the  spending  power and  the  coordinating
or harmonizing  role of the federal  government  are important.
* The  design  of fiscal arrangements  depends  critically  upon  the  reliance  that
economies  place on governments  in  the process  of allocating  and  distributing
resources.  The  greater  is the  role of government,  the more  important  will be
the  role of fiscal arrangements  in  the  sense that  the more  will be expected  of
the federal  government  in fostering  efficiency and  equity.  In a federation  with
decentralized  fiscal responsibilities,  this  implies  an  active  role  for  the  fiscal
arrangements  as means  of ensuring  that  state  decision making  conforms  with
national  objectives.
What  these  general  points  imply  for the particular  set of fiscal arrangements
depends  upon  the  federal  institutions  of the  country  in  question  as  well as  how
decentralized  a federation  it is.  However, there are a set of components  which would
be  beneficial  for a  wide  variety  of federat:ons  on  the  basis  of the  above  analysis.
What  these  imply  for reforms  of fiscal institutions  in  developing  countries  will be
taken  up  again  in  the  last  section.  The  following is a  list  of some  of  the  more
important  components.
i.  Tax  Harmonization  and  Coordination  Arrangements.  The  need  for  special
forms  of  tax  harmonization  an  coordination  will depend  upon  the  extent  of
decentralization  of revenue  raising  in  the  federation.  For  federations  where
state  revenue requirements  are limited,  tax  sources for which harmonization  is
relatively  less important  can  be  assigned  to  the  states.  These  might  include
excise taxes, property  taxes,  licenses and fees, and some resource revenues.  For
these taxes, little  explicit harmonization  is needed.  Tax bases for which harmo-
nization  would be  more important  for equity  and  efficiency reasons  would  be
assigned  to the  federal  government,  such as direct  taxes  (and  transfers),  taxes
on capital  and  even general  taxes  like payroll  and sales taxes.
For more decentralized  federations,  ways must be found of getting  more revenue
raising responsibilities  in the hands  of the states  without  jeopardizing  national
efficiency and  equity.  There  are  various  ways to  do this.  Simple  tax  sharing
arrangements  between the federal  government  and the states  can be negotiated
whereby  the federal  government  retains  control of the base, rate  structure  and
collection,  but  gives a  share  to  the  states.  While  this  is  an  easy  way  to  get
revenue into the hands of the states,  the states  are essentially passive recipients
of revenues with no responsibility  for revenue raising and  therefore limited  fiscal
accountability.  Fiscal  accountability  can be  achieved in  various  ways.  Some
broader  revenue  sources  can  be  assigned  to  the  states  either  exclusively  or
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state assignment, as would  broad-based sales taxes. In both cases, there may be
some benefits from some  harmonization of tax bases and their allocation among
states,  though it is not essential.  In the case of the sales tax,  its ideal form
depends upon the existence of state  participation.  We have mentioned that  it
is administratively difficult, though not impossible, to operate multi-level sales
taxes at  the  state  level because of the  difficulty of accounting for interstate
intermediate goods transactions.  It is possible to achieve some harmonization
between federal and state  level general sales taxes by coordinating the  bases
and collaborating on collections. This is fully compatible with the state  taxes
being single-staged and the federal tax being a VAT.
Harmonization is much more important  if the states are to have some revenue
raising powers in the direct tax fields. Given federal responsibility for national
equity and efficiency,  it is desirable that  the federal government retain control
over the base and rate structure of direct taxes.  States could piggy back onto
federal direct  taxes and  still retain  some responsibility for raising revenues.
For example, as in the Canadian system, the federal government could collect
income taxes on behalf of the  states,  provided the states  agreed to  abide by
the federal base and rate structure.  The states would simply set a single tax
rate to apply to the federal tax base or to federal taxes payable.
Finally, in the case of resource revenues, to the extent that they are decentral-
ized to the states,  some harmonization might also be beneficial. If resource taxes
were levied on economic rents, resource allocation consequences of state  resource
taxes would be rminimal.  However,  typically resource taxes are levied on bases which
include elements of normal capital income as well as rents.9 That  being the case,
state  resource taxes have the  opportunity  for distorting the  allocation of capital
across states, and for being used as beggar-thy-neighbor policy instruments.
ii.  Regulations. Ideally, the regulation of markets for capital, labor and tradeable
good and services should be centralized, to the extent that  such regulation is
used at all. If that is not possible, there should be -,me means of coordinating
or overseeing state regulatory outcomes to be sure that  the internal common
market not  disrupted.  There are  various ways that  such coordination  could
occur.  One way, which is  "hat used in the  United States, is for the  federal
government to have a role in overriding state laws to be sure that  they do not
violate the free flow  of goods and services across internal political boundaries.
Alternatively, the judicial (or quasi-judicial) system could be relied on to rule
on whether state laws are discriminatory or restrictive of interstate  trade.
9  For a  fuller discussion  of resource  taxation,  see Boadway  and  Flatters  (1993).
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relative to revenue raising responsibilities, a fiscal gap will typically exist that
will require transfers from the federal government to states.  In the absence of
reasons to the contrary, transfers should be unconditional and equal per capita
in allocation.  However, there  are two important  reasons for deviating from
this.
One is the requirement for transfers to be equalizing. Equalizing transfers are
required to reduce NFB differences  in order jointly to achieve fiscal efficiency
and equity.  As we have argued, the  general objective of equalizing transfers
is to enable the states to provide comparable levels of public services in their
jurisdictions at comparable levels of tax rates. There are a number of features
to which equalization systems should conform. First, A state's grant should not
be based on the actual behavior of that  state, but on its fiscal capacity relative
to  other states  (which will depend upon how states  taken together behave).
The simplest method is to equalize state  tax  capacities using a formula such
as that  used in the  Canadian federation, whereby the equalizing grant owing
to a state is the difference  between the revenue the state can raise by applying
national  average state  tax rates to its own tax  bases and what can be raised
by applying national average tax rates to national average state  tax bases. 10
Such a system equalizes the potential to raise taxes across states.  There is no
need to take account of actual taxes raised in a state or its tax effort; to do so
would distort its behavior. One might also want to consider equalizing need or
cost differential across states where these are significant, though it is hard  to
do so on an objective basis. Ideally,  equalization should be done on a net basis
such that  the positive amounts owing to the less well-off  states is just  offset
by the negative amounts owing to  the  better  off.  This can  be implemented
by adjusting the overall equal per capita grant mentioned above up or down
for each state  according to  their equalization owing.  Equalization becomes
more important  the more decentralized the system and the more unequal are
the states in their fiscal capacities. It is important that  equalization funds be
unconditional and that they take account of all sources of revenue to states.
The other reason for deviating from a simple unconditional equal per capita
grant  formula concerns the use of conditional grants to influence the  way in
which state governments behave. For one thing, the federal government can use
conditional matching grants to induce states to provide certain public services
at higher levels than they otherwise would. This might be appropriate where
there are significant spillover benefits involved. Matching grants may also be
an imperfect way of taking differential  need and cost of certain types of services
10  See  Shah  (1991) for details  of how this  sort  of system  operates.
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of programs  to begin with,  which they might  not otherwise  do on an individual
basis  (such as universal health  care systems).  However, a matching  component
is typically  not required  for condition  grants  on economic grounds.  The federal
government  may  simply  want  to  ensure  that  state  programs  do  not  violate
national  norms  of efficiency and  equity,  for example,  by imposing  restrictive
state  residency  requirements.  National  standards  can be  achieved by making
the  full  receipt  of general  transfers  (such  as  those  that  would  otherwise  be
used for equalization  alone  or simply to  transfer  funds  to  close the fiscal gap)
contingent  on certain  conditions  being satisfied.  The  conditions  can  be fairly
general,  laying out  basic criteria  that  should be followed rather  than stipulating
program  design  requirements  in  detail.  Candidate  programs  might  include
education,  health  care,  assistance  to  the poor  and  labor  training.  All of these
are services which can efficiently be provided by the states,  but  for which some
harmonization  of standards  is useful.  There  is obviously room  for judgment  in
designing a system  of conditional  grants  for this purpose.  Any such conditions
will necessarily  intrude  on  autonomy  of state.  The  general  rule is that  there
must  be an overriding  national  objective  involved in using the  spending  power
in this  way.
iv.  Institutional  Control.  Who  should  be  responsible  for  de  :gning  the  system
of federal-state  fiscal relations?  There  are various  possible  alternatives.  The
most  obvious one is to make  the federal  government  solely responsible  on  the
grounds  that  they  are  responsible  for the  national  objectives  that  are  to  be
delivered through  the fiscal arrangements.  In many countries,  this is the norm.
A problem  with  it  might  be  the  natural  tendency  for the  federal  government
to  want  to  be too  involved  with  state  decision making  and  not  allow the  full
benefits  of decentralization  to occur.  To some extent,  this  can be overcome by
imposing  constitutional  restrictions  on the ability  of the federal  government  to
override  state  decisions.  Alternatively,  one can have a separate  body involved
in  the  design and  ongoing  reform and  enforcement  of the  fiscal arrangements.
It  could be an impartial  advisory  body, or it  could be body  comprised  of both
federal  and state  representatives.  It could have true decision making authority,
or it could be purely advisory.  In any case, to be effective, it would at the least
need to be able to coordinate  decision making  at the  two levels of government.
Above all, it should be remembered  that  the objective  of the exercise is to obtain
the  benefits  of decentralized  decision making  without  sacrificing the integrity  of the
internal  economic union  and  of national  standards  of equity.
44III.  FISCAL  FEDERALISM  PRACTICES  IN  DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
In  this  section,  we review some features  of fiscal federalism in developing  countries.
Practice  will, of course,  vary from  country  to country,  and  economic circumstances
will as well, so it is very hard to generalize.  Our procedure  will be simply to illustrate
by example  some of the characteristics  of the way in which economic responsibilities
are undertaken  by the various levels of government  in countries  which are explicitly
federal  in  structure.  The  examples  chosen  are  not  intended  to  be  scientific,  but
simply  to  draw on the experience  of a number  of countries  including  Brazil,  China,
India,  Indonesia,  Mexico, Nigeria,  Russia,  and  South  Africa.  We consider in  turn
expenditure  assignments,  tax assignments  and federal-state  grants.
Practices  in  developing  countries  tend  to  differ considerably  from  that  in  in-
dustrialized  federations,  and,  as we shall see, not to  conform particularly  well with
the  theory  discussed  above.  For example,  developing  countries  tend  to  be  much
more centralized  than  their  industrialized  counterparts.  There  are various possible
reasons for this.  However, among them  is that  fact that  the sorts of activities  under-
taken  by the public sector differ considerably  between developing  and industrialized
countries.  For example,  a  much higher  proportion  of the  expenditures  of govern-
ments  in  developing  countries  is on  goods  and  services,  on  capital  expenditures
and  on wages and  salaries than  in industrialized  countries.  Industrialized  countries
spend  a much higher proportion  on subsidies  and transfers  of various  types.  By ex-
penditure  category,  industrialized  countries  spend  a far greater  proportion  of their
budgets  on health  and welfare than  do developing  countries,  while the latter  spend
a higher  proportion  on general public  services and  public  order,  transport  and  com-
municatiol,s  and,  in some cases, on defense.  These differences may help account  for
the  differing  degrees of decentralization  between  the two types  of countries.
1.  Expenditure  Assignments  in  Practice
Theory  suggests  that  the  role of the  central  government  in  the  direct  provision  of
goods  and  services  can be  limited  to  national  public  goods  and  services,  such  as
defense.  Quasi-public  goods,  such  as  education  or  health  care,  and  local  public
goods  and  services may be  provided  at  the local  level,  thus  matching  government
activities  more  closely with  local  preferences.  However,  the  central  government
may  have  a  role  to  play  in  ensuring  that  minimum  standards  are  met  and  that
differences  in  benefits  across jurisdictions  are minimized.  The  central  government
can harmonize  subnational  expenditures  indirectly,  through  regulatory  oversight  or
the  conditional  transfer  of funds.
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economic theory agrees should be centralized.  These include providing national
public goods such as defense; controlling stabilization tools such as monetary policy;
and managing external relations.  Another theoretically sound role for the central
government is to ensure a comrnon internal market through controls over interstate
trade.  The  national government is assigned this  responsibility in India,  Brazil,
and Nigeria. The uneven distribution of natural  resources argues for a federal role
in exploiting oil, gas, and mineral deposits.  The central government is assigned
responsibility for (and property  rights  to) natural  resources in  India,  Indonesia,
Russia, China, Brazil, and Nigeria.
However, many central governments play a larger direct role than the theory
would recommend. For example, in India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Mexico, the
central government accounts for more than 70% of total expenditures. Central gov-
ernments often provide services d.rectly which are, in theory, local responsibilities.
Edlucation is a prime example. In South Africa, education at all levels (pre-primary
through tertiary) is the sole responsibility of the national government, except in the
self-governing  territories and independent states.
Even in countries where the de Jure assignment of expenditures agrees with the-
oretical principles, practices can differ. Indonesia and Brazil are two cases in point:
expenditure  assignments in legislation agree more closely with theory than do ex-
penditure  assignments in practice.  In Indonesia, for example, legislation assigns
to  local governments responsibilities which include local public works, education,
public health, local welfare, and housing. However, local governments do not con-
trol  these activities; regulations to transfer power formally to the local level have
not been passed. In practice, responsibilities overlap and the national government
retains  a dominant  role.  The central government can be involved in  such local
functions as buses, police protection, and traffic management.  Education is again
a good example.  The central government has an appropriate oversight role in its
responsibility for policy development and curricula.  However, the central govern-
ment also designs all buildings, oversees  local construction of primary schools, and
assumes responsibility for teachers at  all levels.  The role of local governments in
primary education, frequently considered a local responsibility, is limited to acquir-
ing land and building the schools. The extent of central government involvement
can vary in  different regions of the country.  Expenditure  responsibilities are fre-
quently determined on an ad hoc basis, despite the clear assignment of functions in
legislation.
In Brazil, the 1988 Constitution defined roles for the federal, state,  and mu-
nicipal governments which are consistent with the theoretical framework outlined
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include health,  education, social welfare, housing, and environmental protection.
In  these areas,  the  role of the federal government is to  set standards,  while the
states  are responsible for service delivery. In practice, however, all three levels of
government provide education, health services, social assistance, and care for chil-
dren and the elderly. For example, the federal government does not limit its role in
education to defining national goals. Instead, the federal government provides sec-
ondary and university education; in some cases, primary education is also a federal
responsibility. In several municipalities, state and federal governments are involved
in such purely local functions as public markets. Frequently service delivery is not
coordinated across government levels.  Despite the  expanded role of the national
government, however, Brazil remains a decentralized federation.  The share of ex-
penditures undertaken by the central government is comparatively small, at 43% in
1988.
India is an interesting case in which the dominance of the  Union government
results  from an overlap of legislated activities.  Expenditure  assignments in the
constitution  are not inconsistent with the theoretical framework. However,  central
government control of discretionary transfers and the extra-constitutional  Planning
Comrmission  expands the  role of the  Union government. For example, the consti-
tution  assigns to  the  states responsibility for programs such as irrigation,  roads,
agriculture,  education, and health.  Concurrent state  and  Union responsibility is
exercised over social security, employmert, labor welfare, and economic and social
planning.  This  mix of subnational  provision and  central oversight is  consistent
with  theoretical  principles. However, the role of the central government is larger
than  these  assignments suggest.  The extra-constitutional  Planning  Commission
gives the central government direct control over development expenditures.  Dis-
cretionary transfers by government ministries increase the influence of the  central
government. In total, the Union government dominates the federation, undertaking
70% of expenditures in 1992.
In Mexico, the dominance of the central government results from both  the di-
rect assignment of functions to the federal level and the supposed inability of lower
governments to  assume delegated responsibilities.  In  the Mexican federation the
central government undertakes 80% of expenditures. This figure indicates that  the
central government dominates its partners  in areas of concurrent expenditure as-
signment, such as health and education (concurrent federal-state).  In addition, the
central government maintains more direct involvement to compensate for the inabil-
ity of local governments to undertake their assigned responsibilities. For example,
constitutional reforms in 1983 assigned to municipal governments responsibility for
administering local functions such as water supply and sewerage systems, security,
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slow, however, as many municipalities lack the administrative capacity to operate
or maintain local services.
The Russian Federation provides an interesting counterexample to the problem
of a clear legislative assignment of functions which is not implemented in practice.
In  Russia the  opposite situation  holds.  Expenditure assignments have not been
defined in legislation. In practice, the functions performed by the different levels of
government correspond reasonably well to theory.  In particular,  the local (rayon)
governments bear primary responsibility for social services, funding almost all pri-
mary and  secondary education, 85% of health  care, and  80% of public utilities.
Some practices contradict theory, however. The central government plays a rela-
tively large a role in transportation (constructing all roads) and education (funding
all universities, technical schools, and most vocational schools). The central gov-
ernment has transferred to lower levels some responsibilities which it might have
maintained, in particular, investment for highways,  military housing, and airports.
An issue to  be addressed as the  economy moves toward a market  system is the
assignment to governments of the functions performed by state-owned enterprises.
Enterprises frequently built roads, buildings, schools, and hospitals, functions which
are often decentralized in developing  countries.
:China  is another fairly decentralized system.  On average, the central govern-
ment  undertakes less than half (47%) of direct expenditures.  As in Russia, sub-
national  governments (provincial and local) are responsible for most expenditures
on health and education.  These include funding hospitals, clinics, all government
schools, salaries for medical and teaching staff, and administration and maintenance
of the systems. Welfare expenditures are also a subnational responsibility. The de-
gree of local autonomy is limited, however. Local budgets are determined as part
of a consolidated budget comprising all government levels.  The approval process
for lower level budgets allows the central government to exercise some controi over
these subnational functions. This system of local provis:on and central supervision
is consistent with  theory.  Nonetheless, the  central government directly provides
some services which could be delegated to  lower authorities.  These include the
funding of all national universities as well as hospitals and utilities in some urban
areas.
From this brief survey it is clear that central governments often directly provide
services which ought, in theory, be functions of state and local governments. It also
appears  that  delivery of services through extra-governmental bodies is uncommon
in  developing countries.  The Planning Commission in India is a clear exception,
as are the Regional Services Councils of South Africa. These councils were created
48to  upgrade  infrastructure  in  black and  poor local areas  and  to  improve service
delivery. The Councils were assigned the task of coordinating services across local
governments in an effort to achieve economies  of scale and improve efficiency.
The assignment of the  provision of social welfare or social insurance  differs
across countries. As noted above, in India social security is a concurrent center-state
responsibility.  In Brazil all levels of government are involved in  social assistance.
In Indonesia, family and social welfare is the responsibility of both  provincial and
local level governments. By contrast, in South Africa social security and welfare are
responsibilities of the central government alone. In Nigeria  labor welfare  is a central
government responsibility, as is the payment of any pensions due from public funds.
In  Russia, on the  other hand,  local governments undertake income maintenance
programs,  which include family allowances, pensioner welfare, and compensation
for children.  In  China subnational  governments are also responsible for welfare
expenditures on orphans. the disabled, and the childless  elderly. Of course, as we
have mentioned above, expenditures of this type tend to be relatively less important
in developing countries than they are in industrialized countries.
2.  Revenue  Assignments  in  Practice
The theory of revenue assignments  suggests that the federal government should have
control of direct taxes which are levied on mobile factors (such as capital);  which
redistribute  wealth (taxes on income, wealth, or gifts); or which are assessed on
unequally distributed bases (resources). The federal role in assessing  indirect taxes
is less obvious. Efficiency  gains may result from having some degree of harmoniza-
tion in sales taxes or other instruments  which affect a common internal market.
Administering a VAT at the federal level may be less costly.
The states  and  their  municipalities could obtain their  own tax  revenues ei-
ther  by being assigned some tax  bases exclusively,  or by sharing tax  fields with
the federal government. Ideal candidates for the former might be excise taxes and
taxes on immobile factors such as real property. They could also use general sales
taxes,  though for administrative simplicity single stage taxes would be most suit-
able. Larger amounts of revenue can be obtained by joint occupancy of broad based
tax sources like general sales and income taxes. The advantage of joint occupancy is
that,  depending on the role of the federal government in setting and administering
the tax, two important  objectives can be achieved  - the harmonization of the tax
across the nation combined with the decentralization of some revenue raising re-
sponsibility to the states.  For example, a formal arrangement by which the federal
government selects the base and rate structure of the income tax  and administers
the tax can be combined with the ability of each state to choose its own rate level.
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auditing or choosing their own rate  structure, at the expense of some harmoniza-
tion.  The flexibility of such joint arrangements is somewhat more difficult with a
VAT, since the ability of the states to choose even their own rate levels complicates
the  administration  of the  tax  considerably. Of course, user fees and charges are
appropriate at all levels of government.
Revenue systems in developing countries are typically characterized by a large
central government role and by heavy reliance  on indirect taxes of all sorts, including
general sales taxes, excise taxes and taxes on imports and exports, and on resource
taxes where this is feasible. For example, in Indonesia the central government raised
95% of all revenues in 1990/91. The most important sources of funds were oil and
gas receipts (42.6% of revenues) and the VAT (17.9%). Income taxes ranked third
on the  list,  providing only 16.3% of total  revenues.  Resource taxes are  also the
main source of federal revenues in Nigeria. This is apparent  when looking at  the
source of funds in the Federation Account, a divisible pool of revenues into which
most federal taxes are paid. In 1988, 46.7%  of Federation Account funds came from
the  tax  on petroleum profits.  An additional 31.5% came from mining rents and
royalties, while customs and excises provided 15.9%. All other  sources of non-oil
revenues together contributed only 5.9%.
China differed from many developing countries in that its central government
played a limited role in tax  collection. Most revenues were collected at the local
level and 'shared-up'.  This system is currently in place in Russia and other countries
with a legacy of central planning. In China, the share of revenues collected by the
central government had  been smaller than its share of expenditures, although by
1986 the shares were almost equal at 4;t  %.  r -.orms which took effect in January
1994 significantly altered the Chinese syst. ..  itral tax administration  agency
was created  to  administer directly the taxes assigned to the  central government.
These reforms imply that  the central government will now collect roughly 60% of
tax  revenues.  The reforms bring the  Chinese system closer to  the  theoretically
desirable framework in which the  central government collects excess revenues in
order to  redistribute funds across subnational jurisdictions.  However, no reforms
have been announced for the  transfer system in  China.  The existing system  of
transfers is  discussed below.  The revenue system in  China  is highly dependent
on indirect  levies.  Almost half (46%) of total  revenues in  the  1988 consolidated
government budget came from indirect and commodity taxes.  Nearly a  third of
revenues were generated by taxes on corporate incomes and profits. The personal
income tax contributed a negligible 1.5%  of revenues. Revenue sources in China are
particularly concentrated. Three taxes generate nearly three-quarters of government
revenues: the enterprise tax, the turnover tax, and the VAT. Five provinces  provide
5041% of total  collections.
Indirect  taxes  are particularly  important  at the state  level in  Brazil and  India.
The most important  sources of state  revenue in India are the sales tax, excise duties,
fees on stamps  and  registrations,  and  taxee  on motor  vehicles and  entertainment.
In  Brazil,  72% of state  revenues  are generated  by three  instruments:  the  VAT (or
ICMS),  which is a state  levy; the  tax on inheritances  and  gifts; and fees for vehicle
registrations.  The  state-level  VAT is discussed in more detail  below.
An exception  to this  reliance on indirect  taxes is South  Africa (though  it could
not  be  characterized  as  a  developing  country  in  the  usual  sense).  Income  taxes
are the  major  source of central  government  revenues.  In 1991/92,  income  taxes on
individuals  generated  38% of total  revenues; another  19% came  from income  taxes
on companies.  The VAT and sales taxes generated  25% of revenues, while the excise
duty  and  fuel tax  raised another  12.4%.
Evaluating  individual  tax instruments,  it is clear that  central governments  con-
trol  almost  all direct  levies, as theory  would suggest.  The  central  government  sets
the  base  and  rates  for all taxes in  Indonesia  and  China.  The  newly-legislated  Rus-
sian  tax  system  assigns similar  controls  to  tbe  national  government.  In  all of the
eight  countries  surveyed,  taxes  on  most  resources  fall under  federal  jurisdiction.
Corporate  profit  taxes  are similarly  under  federal  control.  It  is interesting  to note
that  provincial and  local governments  in China can exercise some discretion  despite
the  formal  control  of  the  central  government.  Enterprise  taxes  are  one  example.
China  has  moved  to  a  system  of 'enterprise  contracts',  in  which  the  tax  liability
of an  enterprise  is negotiated  and  established  for a  period  of three  to  five years.
Subnationdl  governments  can offer tax  holidays  or reduced  rates  to  particular  in-
dustries,  or case-by-case  relief to enterprises.  In addition,  the  1994 reforms include
the possibility  that  provincial and  local government  may have limited  flexibility  to
determine  rates on their own revenue sources.  Business taxes are one revenue source
assigned  to  the  provincial-local  level.
The personal income tax is typically subject  to federal control,  with the central
government  setting  the  base  and  rate  structure,  and  administering  the  tax.  Self-
governing  territories  in South  Africa have access to this  instrument  as well. Nigeria
is unique  insofar  as the  federal  government  collects only  a limited  share  of income
taxes.  It  has access only to  taxes paid by the armed forces, external  affairs employ-
ees, and residents  o' the Federal  Capital  Territory.  The predominance  of state-level
income  tax  collection  hinders  redistribution.
In  a  few cases,  state  governments  control  tax  instruments  other  than  the  in-
come tax which  should  theoretically  be assigned  to the  national  level because  they
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actions  tax  is a  state  instrument.  In  Brazil,  the  taxes  on inheritances,  gifts,  and
supplemental  capital  gains  are  state  levies.  In  Nigeria,  estate  and  gifts  taxes  are
assessed by the states  as well.
The most  significant potential  disruptions  to the efficiency of the internal  com-
mon  market  are the sales or VAI' taxes levied at  the state  level.  In India,  the state
sales  taxes  create  a complex  system.  The  number  of tax  rates  varies across states,
ranging  from six in  Orissa to  seventeen  in  Bihar and  Gujarat.  The  central  govern-
ment  has attempted  to harmonize  the system,  imposing restrictions  on rate  changes
for 'essential  and declared goods'  and increasing  the number of commodities  subject
to  the  Union sales tax.
In Brazil,  the VAT (or ICMS)  is a state  levy as we have mentioned  above.  The
tax  is  administered  by  a  Council  whose members  are  the  finance  ministers  of all
states.  Council  approval  is required  for any  member  state  seeking to  change  the
base  or  rate  of its  tax.  In general,  the  Council has  not  approved  rate  changes but
has allowed exemptions  from the  tax  base for different states.  This  system  has  the
potential  to create  differing VAT systems  across the country, disrupting  the internal
market.  Administrative  costs  will also increase,  as  tax  credits  across jurisdictions
mlast be resolved.  There  is a separate  administrative  problem  related  to the ICMS.
The base  of this tax  overlaps with  other instruments,  in particular  the federal  sales
tax  on industrial  products  and  the  local  tax  on services.  Collection  of these three
taxes is not  coordinated.
In some countries,  instruments  which are good local revenue sources in theory
are not  necessarily  under  local  control  in practice.  The prime  example is the  prop-
erty  tax.  In Indonesia  and  China,  taxes on land,  property  or housing  are levied by
the  central  government  (as are all taxes).  However, the  1994 reforms in China  may
increase  local  flexibility  to  set  rates  within  a  certain  range.  In India,  Article  269
of the  Constitution  assigns to the  Union government  the  right  to set  succession  or
estate  duties  on non-agricultural  property,  although  these  duties  have not  always
been levied.  State  governments  in India levy taxes on property  transactions,  includ-
ing immovable  urban  property.  In Brazil,  rural  property  is subject  to a federal  tax.
State  governments  tax  non-agricultural  land  in Nigeria.  Collection  of the  property
tax  in  Nigeria  is a  local  responsibility,  although  the  base  and  rate  are  set  at  the
state  level.
There  are some  examples  of property  taxes  determined  at  the  local  level.  In
Brazil, local govcrnments  set the base and rate and collect the tax on urban  property.
In South  Africa, white local authorities  levy the property  tax  as their  major  source
of revenue.  There  are  some provincial  restrictions  on the  rates  charged,  however.
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difficult to alter rates or assessments, as these changes require the approval of both
the state governor and state congress.
Local governments may also find it difficult to change user fees to recover costs
more effectively. It is not uncommon for the central government to exercise  effective
control over revenue sources nominally assigned to the local level. For example, in
China, municipal Price Commissions have the authority to  adjust rates for public
utilities  without approval from higher levels of government. In practice, however,
housing rents, bus fares, and water rates have not changed in years. In South Africa,
local control of fees varies with  the  type of local government.  Regional services
councils must have federal approval for their rates for water, electricity, and sewer
services. In white local areas, rate changes must be approved at the provincial  level,
but  only if rate payers file a complaint. The rents and service charges collected by
black local authorities, on the other hand, are not under any local control.
In  several countries, local governments have the authority  to set fees within
broad guidelines established by higher governments. In Russia, rayon governments
are  assigned the revenues from 21 taxes and  fees.  While the  base and  rate  can
be determined locally, the central  government has legislated mamimum rates for
most instruments.  In Indonesia all local taxes must be approved by the  central
government. While fees can vary across jurisdictions, the central government tries
to standardize major local taxes. This central role does facilitate a common  internal
market.
3.  Intergovernmental  Transfers
The theory of expenditure and revenue assignments indicates that  it may be op-
timal to  decentralize service delivery more than  decentralizing revenue collection.
This necessarily implies an important  role for intergovernmental transfers.  As we
have discussed above, unconditional revenue transfers are an appropriate  tool to
address the fiscal gap created at lower levels of government by the expenditure and
revenue assignments.  UTnconditional  transfers which attempt  to  equalize govern-
ment resources across the country help address the problem of differential net fiscal
benefits. The externalities associated with many quasi-public goods, such as health
or education,  are appropriately addressed through conditional transfers from the
center to local governments. These cart also be used to harmonize the provision of
state public services so as to foster an efficient and equitable internal common mar-
ket.  These targeted transfers induce the local government to devote more resources
to activities with positive spillovers. Finally, local fiscal responsibility is encouraged
if there is some matching requirement in the transfers.  Recall that one argument fa-
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However, if no local funds are used in these activities, the accountability argument
is weakened considerably. Matching grants can encourage greater responsibility in
expenditures  by requiring the local government to devote its own resources to  a
given activity.
Transfers are a very important  source of funds for subnational governments in
many developing countries. For example, in South Africa, transfers accounted for
85% of provincial revenues in  1989/90.  In Indonesia, central transfers fund 72%
of provincial and 85% of local government expenditures.  In Nigeria, the majority
of state recurrent revenues are provided by shared central funds. Excluding Lagos
with its strong local tax base, shared federal revenues provided between 66.8% and
94.7%  of recurrent state revenues in 1989. States in Mexico  are similarly dependent
on central funds. In the poorer states,  for example, federal grants account for 70%
to 90% of the total state budget.
a.  Unconditional Transfers
In most  countries, unconditional transfers  are used to  address the  problem of a
vertical  fiscal gap.  An exception is South  Africa, which is uniquely lacking in
unconditional funding. There is no unconditional revenue sharing. The only grant
that  appears  to  be unconditional is a  transfer  to  black local author.ties.  This
program is also the  only transfer program in  South Africa which allocates funds
by formula.  Each black local authority  receives a fixed payment.  The remaining
funds are distributed through a formula with a positive weight on population and a
negative weight on per capita income. These grants are a major source of funding.
In the Western Cape province, the transfers covered 62% of general expenditures in
seven black local authorities in 1991/92.
In other  developing countries, unconditional revenue sharing is common.  In
some cases, it  addresses only the fiscal gap:  revenues are  allocated on  the  basis
of origin  (the  principle of derivation) alone, with  no attempt  made to  equalize
resources across regions.  This is the  case in Indonesia for forestry royalties and
license fees, as well as rents on mining land.  In Mexico, an arrangement begun in
the  1930s continues to provide selected states  with transfers based on their share
of petroleum tax revenues. In Brazil, a number of municipal transfers, both federal
and state, are based  on oriin.  Municipalities receive, as federal transfers, all payroll
deductions from income tax on municipal employees;  half of the rural property tax
revenues in  t.b  jurisdictions; and  a sizable share of natural  resource taxes  by
origin: 70% of the tax on gold aiid half the revenues from taxes on hydroelectricity
and minerals.  State transfers of the value-added tax, vehicle registration fees, and
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These  taxes  comprised  almost  a  third  of municipal  revenues  in  1987.  States  can
adjust  the formula  to allocate  the tax revenues by other factors  which they consider
important.  In  Para,  for example,  population,  area,  and  fiscal effort  are  used  to
allocate  the VAT and  product  tax revenues.
As noted  earlier,  Russia and  China both  have had  a 'bottom-up'  tax  collection
system:  the  majority  of  taxes  are  collected  at  the  local  level  and  transferred  to
higher  governments.  In  this  framework,  revenue  sharing  is done  on  the  basis  of
origin  almost  by  definition.  Shared  revenues  are in  fact  simply  funds  which  the
lower  government  has  retained.  Within  the  revenue-sharing  system  itself,  there
is  no  reallocation  of funds  across  jurisdictions.  The  current  Chinese  system  of
central-provincial  revenue  sharing  developed  in  the  1980s.  Previously,  provincial
governments  had  transferred  almost all revenues collected to the central  government
and  negotiated  over the  share  to be  returned.  The  central  government  reallocated
funds across provinces by establishing  different sharing  rates.  In the current  system,
the  bilateral  negotiations  are  over  the  share  of funds  to  be  transferred  from  the
province  to  the  center.  A separate  system  of grants  was established  to  reallocate
funds  across  provinces.
The  share  of revenues retained  by a province  was determined  initially  by for-
mula.  The  fraction  equaled  the  1983 ratio  of 'allowable'  local government  expendi-
tures  to actual  revenue collections.  After  two years,  ad hoc adjustments  were made
to  the  shares  determined  by the formula.  By the late  1980s considerable  diversity
existed  in provincial tax obligations.  Ten provinces agreed to a multi-year  'contract'
in  which a  tax  quota  was established,  given the projected  growth  of revenues from
a  1987 base.  Provinces  could retain  revenues in excess of the  quota;  shortfalls  were
to  be met  through  accumulated  reserves.  For three  wealthier  provincial-level  gov-
ernments,  revenues above the  quota  were also shared  with  the  central  government.
In contrast,  Shanghai  (a city of provincial  status)  was committed  to a fixed annual
transfer  to  the central  government.
The  Chinese  system  of intergovernmental  transfers  has  not  been  revised  to
reflect the 1994 reforms in tax assignments.  Unless expenditures  are also reassigned,
the  expanded  role of the central government  in tax collection  implies  that  transfers
from  the  center  to lower level governments  will assume  greater  importance.
In Russia, the division of revenues between the central and  provincial (or oblast)
governments  is specified in the  'Law on Basic Principles  of Taxation'  and other  leg-
islation  passed  in mid-1992. However, quarterly  budgets  during  the year superseded
the  statutory  assignments.  Revenue allocations  were changed  in  part  to  eliminate
emerging  government  deficits.  An important  difference  between  the  Russian  and
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established in Russia. Ez ante transfers were included for the first time in the third
quarter  budget.  Thus changes in assigned revenues effectively replaced transfers
during the first half of the year.
This was particularly true for the NAT. In legislation, the revenues are assigned
to the center; in practice, they were shared with the oblasts. It is worth noting that
the  most important  source of indirect tax  revenue, the  excises on  alcohol, were
divided evenly between the central and oblast-level governments in both  practice
and legislation.  The shares of other  VAT revenues retained by each oblast  were
determined by ad hoc negotiations in the first quarter.  These shares, which took
the  emerging subnational deficits into account, differed across the  91 oblasts.  In
each succeeding quarterly budget, the VAT shared changed. By the end of the year,
an oblast could retain between 25% and 35% of the revenues it collected, depending
on the economic strength of the region.
The differential VAT shares are only one aspect of the non-standardized rev-
enue sharing arrangements in Russia.  As in China, considerable diversity exists in
the current arrangements with separate oblasts, and not all of them are legally sanc-
tioned. For example, Bashkiria adopted a 'single channel' agreement: the oblast re-
tains all revenues collected  and makes a monthly transfer of a fixed  nominal amount.
Twenty oblasts unilaterally decided the proportion of revenues they will share with
the central government. The shares are reportedly lower than those stipulated in
the legislation. The ability of an oblast government to control revenue-sharing is a
result of the 'bottom-up'  tax collection system.
There  are a  number of examples in  which unconditional revenue sharing is
used to  address the problem of horizontal inequity.  In these cases, factors other
than origin of revenues by state are taken into account in the distribution of funds.
For example, in India, an appointed Finance Commission  determines the allocation
of snared revenues, such as the federal income tax and Union excise dilities. The
formulas used by the  Ninth Finance Commission include measures of population,
the  income gap between each state and the richest region, tax collection. income-
adjusted  total  population,11 and backwardness. 12 State-level deficits were also
taken into account in distributing the excise duties.
In Brazil, revenues from two federal taxes, the income tax and the tax on indus-
trial  products,  are shared through two participation funds, one for states  and one
1  Three-year  average  per capita  income  multiplied  by  1971 total  population.
12  A  state's  proportion  of national  Scheduled  Case  and  Scheduled  Tribe  population  and  agri-
cultural  workers.
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which initially divides the pool of revenues across regions in the  country, setting
aside 85% for states in the north, north-east, and center-west regions. The revenues
are then allocated across eligible states by a formula which includes population as
a proxy for fiscal need and the inverse of per capita income as a measure of fiscal
capacity. However, the Council rejected the shares derived from this formula. The
shares actually in use through 1991  were the result of modifying the formula through
negotiations.  The negotiated shares were higher than  the formula for all but  two
states in the north and north-east.  Shares were lower elsewhere. The distribution
of municipal funds is similar.  The pool of revenues is divided across categories of
municipalities; for example, 12% is set aside for state  capitals and large munici-
palities.  Within  each category, funds are allocated by a formula which takes into
account population and per capita income.
In Nigeria, federal transfers follow a similar pattern.  Federal revenues are di-
vided across levels of government by fixed percentages.  The state  and municipal
portions are then redistributed  by formula. In  1991, for example, states  received
30% of federal revenues. These were allocated by a formula which took into account
minimum government responsibilities (equality of states), population, social devel-
opment, 13 land mass and terrain,  and internal revenue effort.  The largest weight
is placed on equality.  The same formula was used to allocate municipal revenues.
A problem with  revenue sharing was the  appropriation by a number of states  of
the federal funds intended for municipalities. The 1989 Constitution, scheduled to
take effect with  the return  to  civilian rule, eliminates the role of the  state  as an
intermediary.
Recent changes in the system of federal-state transfers in Mexico  have increased
the degree of equalization. Roughly 18%  of federal revenues are transferred through
a consolidated fund.  By 1994, half of these revenues will be distributed  on a per
capita  basis.  The other half will be allocated on the  basis of tax  collections.  A
state's share of the fund will rise or fall as revenue collections from a particular  set
of taxes change relative to the national average. A smaller Municipal Fund allocates
revenues to the states to pass on to municipalities. These revenues are allocated in
inverse proportion to transfers from the larger fund.
While most countries engage in some unconditional revenue sharing, uncondi-
tional grants are less common. In India, the Finance Commission provides grants-
in-aid to states expected to run a deficit. The methodology for identifying deficit
states has improved. The Ninth Finance Commission  introduced the use of a Rep-
13  The social  development  factor  consists  of two components:  the direct  level of primary  school
enrollment  and  the  inverse  of enrollment.  The  larger  weight  was placed  on  the  direct  level.
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significant opposition  was encountered.  The Sixth Finance  Commission (1974-1984)
calculated  expenditure  needs using the concept of equal  per  capita  expenditures  on
social  services.  The  grants  are fixed transfers  which  remain  unchanged  until  the
next  Commission  review.
In  China,  the  central  government  makes  transfers  to  provinces  which  are  in
deficit  after  applying  the  revenue-sharing  formula.  Provinces  for  whom  the  ratio
of expenditure  to  revenues exceeds one retain  all their  revenues  and  receive these
ad-hoc  grants.  Russia  also  developed  a  system  of  transfers  to  deal  with  oblast
deficits  during  1992. As VAT shares  became standardized,  the  central  government
negotiated  transfers  to deficit oblasts  on an ad b-hc basis.
The  use  of negotiations  in  many  of these  unconditional  transfers  is theoreti-
cally  unappealing.  Allocating  funds  through  negotiations  rewards  grantsmanship
on  the  part  of  the  recipient.  It  also increases  the  uncertainty  surrounding  lower
level budgets,  and  makes the  transfer  process far from transparent.  There is a sep-
arate  concern  that  negotiated  transfers  to  cover deficits will encourage  subnational
governments  to  run deficits.
b.  Conditional  Transfers
The  allocation  of targeted  grants  by formula is rare.  Indonesia  is a clear exception
where  formulas  are used  for all transfer  programs.  Provincial,  district,  and  village
governments  receive  general  purpose  transfers  through  separate  funds.  Most  of
the  provincial  grant  and  all of the  village grants  are  allocated  on  an  equal-share
basis.  The provincial  transfer  also takes into account  the total  area  of the province.
District  transfers  are  made  primarily  on a per-capita  basis,  with  each jurisdiction
also  receiving  a  mlinimum grant.  The  central government  control  over these  funds
varies.  The  district  transfers  are subject  to  strict  controls:  funding  must  be  used
on infrastructure  projects  which  create  local employment  and  use local  materials.
Projects  funded  through  village transfers  must  be  approved  by  the local  mayor or
district  chief.  Controls  on the provincial transfers  have weakened.
Specific  purpose  grants  in  Indonesia  are also allocated  through  formulas.  For
example,  provincial governments have access to funds targeted  at road improvement.
The transfers  are based on a formula taking into account  the length  and  condition  of
roads  as well as the unit  costs of construction  and  maintenance.  A separate  grant
program  funds  most  health  care  expenditures.  Local  needs  for  medical  care  are
assessed  using  a per  capita  allowance for medicine,  standardized  expenditures  for
health  facilities.  a benchmark  figure of the number  of health  facilities  needed  for a
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facility  renovation.  Part  of the health  care grant is an in-kind  transfer  consisting  of
drugs,  equipment,  and  other  supplies.  The  grant  includes  a matching  component:
local governments  must  purchase  the land for the health  facilities.
A similar  requirement  exists  in the grant  program  for primary  education:  local
governments  must  purchase  the  land  for new schools.  Transfers  through  this  pro-
gram funded  90% of local expenditures  on primary  schools in  1990/91.  The factors
taken  into  account  in  allocating  the  primary  school grants  include  the  number  of
school-age children  who cannot  be accommodated  in existing facilities,  renovations
required  in existing facilities, the needs of new settlements  or migrating  populations,
and  textbook  requirements.  The provision of textbooks  is another  in-kind  transfer.
India  is  another  country  which  allocates  targeted  transfers  by  formula.  In
particular,  the Planning  Commission uses the Modified Gadgil Formula to distribute
the  majority  of plan  funds.  The  available  pool  of resources  is first  divided  across
regions  of  the  country.  For  example,  during  the  Sixth  Plan  period  roughly  21%
of the  total  plan  assistance  was reserved for seven Special  Category  States. 14  The
remaining  funds  were allocated  according  to  the following criteria:  60% weight on
a  state's  share  o;  population;  20% weight  on  per-capita  income  (only  for  states
with  below-average  income);  10%/  weight on the special needs of a state;  and a  10%
weight on relative  tax efforts.
Most specific  purpose  transfers  are allocated  without  a  formula,  allowing  the
central  government  considerable  discretion.  In  India,  for  example,  roughly  one-
third  of federal  transfers  during  the mid-1980s consisted  of direct  grants  by central
government  ministries.  This  is roughly  the  same proportion  of transfers  that  was
allocated  by  the  Planning  Commission.  Yet  for the  ministerial  grants,  no formal
criteria  existed.  These  transfers  frequently  took  the form of contingency  grants  for
'natural  calamities'  or scheme-wise transfers  to fund  specific federal  projects.
As noted  earlier, the only formula  grant in South Africa is the transfer  to black
local  authorities.  Federal  transfers  in South  Africa typically  involve some  element
of discretion.  For example,  the central  government  provides  most  funding  for work
on  'proclaimed  major  roads'.  The decisions about  which projects  to undertake  are
made  by provincial  committee.  The central  government  itself places strict  controls
on the funds  it transfers  to  the provinces.  Provincial  grants  are determined  as part
of the  general  central  budget.  The grants  are divided into three  categories  (health,
14  Assam,  Himachal  Pradesh,  Jammu  and  Kashmir,  Manipur,  Meghalaya,  Nagaland,  and  Tri-
pura;  states  with  strategic  significance  and  special  difficulties  due  to  terrain  and  tribal
populations.
59roads,  and other)  and are targeted  for specific programs.  Provinces  cannot reallocate
funds  across  programs  without  central  approval.  It  appears  that  'negotiating  skill'
plays  a role in  determining  the level of resources  given to a province.
One unusual  aspect  of South African  transfers  is the use of matching  grants.  In
1991/92,  health  care grants  comprised  the rmajority of federal transfers;  most health
grants  are awarded  on a  matching  basis.  The  instrument  used  most  frequently  is
a matching  grant  for health  inspectors  and  clinics:  the federal government  finances
87.5% of expenditures  while the local government  funds  12.5%. The grant  is open-
ended,  but  the  total  expenditure  must  be approved  by the central  government.
In  China,  all  grants  are  made  on  an  ad  hoc basis.  Specific  grants  can  be
given to  provinces  to conmpensate for a bad harvest  or low enterprise  profits  due  to
technical  investments.  All provinces  have access to a year-end  reconciliation  grant
to  compensate  for any  changes in  enterprise  ownership.  Earmarked  grants  can be
awarded  to  underdeveloped  regions; to fund  capital  projects;  or in cases of natural
disaster.  Neither  the total  pool of funds nor the criteria  for allocating  the resources
is specified  by formula.
In  Russia,  transfers  were  introduced  into  the  third-quarter  budget  in  1992.
These  transfers  were negotiated  and  available  only  to  oblasts  considered  in  need.
A 'Law  on Subventions'  passed  late  in  1992 will create  targeted  grants  to  oblasts.
These  grants  are  not  intended  to  address  general  deficits  but  rather  to  finance
physical  and  social infrastructure.  The legislation  does not  specify either  the total
volume  of transfers  or  the  criteria  to  be  used in  distributing  funds.  Observers  of
the  developing  Russian  system  express  some concern  that  oblasts  are being  made
too dependent  on their  own revenue sources.  A lack of equalizing  transfers  to offset
the  allocation  of revenues by origin could create  a federation  in which the  quality  of
local services differs sharply  across jurisdictions.  These differential  net fiscal benefit
are both  inefficient and  inequitable.
In  Brazil,  negotiated  transfers  (convenios) fund regional  development,  agricul-
ture,  education,  health,  and housing.  An analysis of transfers  in 1985-86 found that
most  convenios were based on ad hoc decisions and  lacked formal criteria.  The cen-
tral  government  can  exercise  considerable  discretion  and  control  over  subnational
activities.  For example,  primary  education  transfers  are made  through  the  Conve-
nio  Unico.  States  and  rmunicipalities must  submit  detailed  proposals  to  document
the  goals to  be achieved by each funded  project.
As  noted  earlier,  the  use of negotiated  or  ad hoc transfers  generates  several
concerns.  It  introduces  uncertainty  into local budgets,  rewards grantsmanship,  and
makes  the  process  of obtaining  funds  less transparent  for  recipients.  A separate
60issue  which  emerges from  this  review of conditional  transfers  is the  limited  use of
matching  funds.  Indonesia  and  South  Africa  are  the  exceptions,  requiring  some
local  funding  in their  health  or education  transfers.
IV.  AN  AGENDA  FOR  FISCAL  RESTRUCTURING  AND  REFORM
The  principles  reviewed  in  Section  II  and  the  catalogue  of practices  outlined  in
Section  III  lead  us  to  some  tentative  suggestions  for restructuring  the  system  of
federal-state  fiscal relations  and  responsibilities  in developing  countries.  Consider-
able  economic.  political  and  administrative  judgment  will be  involved in  deciding
which  of the  reforms  are desirable  or even feasible in different  countries.  The sug-
gestions  made here should be taken  mainly  as indicative  of a general approach  to ra-
tionalizing  the fiscal structure  in accordance  with a set of reasonably  well-developed
principles  drawn both  from the literature  and from practices  in industrialized  coun-
tries.  In many  cases, they  amount  to little  more than  posing questions  that  should
be asked  about  existing  systems.
The suggestions  are organized  according  to  the main classifications used in the
paper  and  are presented  in point  form for greater  clarity.
1.  Reallocating  Expenditure  Responsibilities
a.  The  decentralization  of fiscal  decision  making  and  responsibility  should  be
viewed  as  a  desirable  objective  of the  fiscal system.  Decentralization  should
apply  in  the  absence  of convincing  arguments  in favor of centralizing  respon-
sibilities.  National  objectives  can  often  be  accompanied  by  decentralization
of delivery  of services  by use  of such  things  as  conditional  grants  or  regula-
tion.  Where  it is necessary,  accountability  should  be  hierarchical,  with  states
reporting  to  the  federal  government,  and  the  municipalities  reporting  to  the
states.  Special  interest  bodies  with  fiscal accountability  and  possibly  political
accountability  may be created  for particular  areas as an alternative  to creating
a separate  level of government  (e.g.,  education  boards,  environmental  boards).
b.  The federal  government  should  assume primary  responsibility  for the provision
of national  public  goods  and  services,  for  efficiency of the  internal  common
market,  for redistributive  equity,  and  for dealing  with  other  nations.  As well,
macroeconomnic policy  should  be  a federal  responsibility,  though  fiscal policy
can  be  shared  with  the  states  in  a  coordinated  fashion.  The  federal  govern-
ment  should  I < responsible  for transfers  to  persons and  to  businesses  and  for
regulation  of labor  and  capital,  and  for goods  and  services which  are  mobile
across states.
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services, for the delivery of quasi-private goods and services such as education
and  health,  for fiscal equity  among municipalities, and  for overseeing local
government decision making.
d.  Wnere jurisdiction for a public service is shared, the roles of the various levels
of government should be clarified.  Generally, the federal government will be
involved with o.verall  policy, setting standards, and auditing; state governments
with an oversight function; and local governments with the actual delivery of
services and infrastructure.
e.  The lack of local administrative experience, institutions and competence should
not be used as an excuse for not decentralizing responsibilities.  If necessary,
transitional funding and training should be provided.
f. In some cases, asymmetric decentralization may be the preferred option, espe-
cially where municipalities and rural regions differ greatly in size and popula-
tions.
2.  Responsibility  for Taxation
a.  Both efficiency  and equity factors infltuence  tax assignment. Efficiency  consider-
ations would suggest centralizing taxes applied on more mobile bases. Equity
considerations would suggest centralizing taxes which serve a redistributive
purpose.
b.  Direct taxes are good candidates for federal assignment, especially corporation
taxes,  capital taxes, personal income taxes, and taxes on wealth and  wealth
transfers.  Taxes on trade  should also be federal.  Personal income taxes are
suitable for piggybacking by the  state  governments.  This  would give them
access to  a potentially lucrative tax  base while preserving the benefits of a
harmonized tax system.
c. The states could use indirect taxes, both excises (including energy taxes) and
general sales taxes. In the case of the latter,  state sales taxes might be single-
staged for administrative and  compliance reasons.  The use of a VAT at  the
state  level, either alone or jointly  with the  federal government, could create
administrative difficulties. The existence of a VAT at the federal level makes
it easier to adminster a harrnonized retail stage tax at the state level simulta-
neously. Payroll taxes could be used by the states.  Property  taxes are ideally
suited for local revenues, though the state government may well have a role in
assessment and in equalizing municipal revenues. User charges are also a good
62source of state  and  local revenue.
d.  Resource  taxes are  an  interesting  case.  Efficiency considerations  would  make
thern  uitable  for state  use since they  are immobile.  However, in many  coun-
tries, resource tax bases are very unevenly distributed  so fiscal inefficiencies and
inequities  can arise from  their  assignment  to  state  governments.  In these  cir-
cumstances,  federal assignment  would be desired.  If some or all resource  taxes
are assigned  to  the states,  it is important  that  the  federal  government  imple-
ment  a  system  of overarchinlg equalizing  transfers  as  discussed  below  which
includes  state  resource  taxes.
e.  Tax  harmonization  and  coordination  are  important  objectives  of tax  policy.
They contribute  to the efficiency of the internal  common market,  reduce  collec-
tion and compliance  costs and help to achieve national  standards  of equity.  Tax
harmonization  may  be horizontal  (among  states)  as  well as vertical  (between
the  federal  government  and  the states).  In the  case of tax  bases jointly  occu-
pied by the federal  government  and  the states,  harmonization  can be achieved
without  sacrificing state  fiscal responsibility  by having a single centralized  col-
lection procedure  combined with  the ability of the states  to decide on their own
tax  rates.  Such vertical  harmonizatiorl  can  be of varying  degrees.  The  states
may simply be required  to  abide by the federal  base, but  be allowed to imapose
their  own rate  structuires.  Or  they  may  be  required  to  abide  by  the  federal
rate  structure  and only be allowed to  choose their  own rate  levels and  possible
scheduiles of credits.  Fiscal  responsibility  would require  that  they  at  least  be
able to  set  their own rate  levels. A formula  must  exist for allocating  tax  bases
amoiig  states  for those  who are taxpayers  in more than  one  state.
f.  It is rather  more difficult to harmonize  indirect  taxes  than  to harmonize  direct
taxes.  On  the  other  hand,  harmonization  of indirect  taxes  is  not  nearly  as
pressing a need since the efficiency costs of decentralized  indirect  tax systems is
not likely to be high and equity objectives  are not likely to be threatened.  Since
state  sales taxes should be single-staged,  it will not be possible to operate  a joint
federal-state  VAT system.  The  best  that  can be  done  is to  adopt  a  common
base for the state  sales tax  as for the federal  VAT and jointly  administer  them.
If the states  alone operate  general  sales taxes,  their  bases could be harmonized
by agreement.  If left uncoordinated,  some harmonization  will occur  naturally
through  inter-state  tax competition.  The same may be said for selective excises.
Large  differentials in  rates  will give rise to  cross-border  shopping  problems.
g.  Tax sharing  schemes in  which the  revenues  from  a federally-administered  tax
source is shared  in a given way with the states  of origin may be used to address
fiscal gaps  at  the  state  level.  These  have  the  advantage  that  the  tax  system
63remains highly harmonized.  However,  they have the significant disadvantage
that  no fiscal responsibility is assumed by the states. It is generally preferable
for the states to be allowed to set their own rates within an otherwise harmo-
nized system. If revenue sharing is used, it is preferable that it not be done on
a tax-by-tax basis.
3.  Conditional  Grants
a.  The traditional argument for conditional grants is to address the problem of
spillovers  across states. These can occur because the benefits of public spending
can spiU  over directly to residents of neighboring states, or because persons are
mrobile  across states.  For this purpose, matching grants are useful.
b.  Perhaps more important is the use of federal-state conditional grants as a means
by which the  federal government can  achieve national efficiency and equity
objectives while at the same time allowing  the states to deliver public services.
These need not be matching grants.  The federal government can provide funds
to the states for uses  in general areas conditional on the programs in those areas
satisfying certain fairly general minimum national standards.  For efficiency  of
the internal common market, state programs may have to be portable across
states  so that  internal  migration is not  distorted.  In  the  case of education
and training programs, a common curriculum and set of qualifications could be
adopted. For equity purposes, state public services  might have to satisfy general
accessibility  or comprehensiveness  criteria. As in the case of tax harmonization,
the use of conditional grants enables the federation to simultaneously achieve
the benefits of decentralization while satisfying national efficiency  and equity
objectives. Conditional  bloc grants with general criteria is the most appropriate
form of such grants.
c.  Grants  should be allocated using formulas which are both  transpaient  and
predictable,  rather  than  ad hoc and discretionary.  In some countries, there
are an incredibly large number of specific  grar.t programs. For many of these,
program objectives are either not specified or specified vaguely. They may be
used largely for political objectives rather than in the pursuit  of key national
objectives.
4.  Equalizing  Transfers
a.  In a  decentralized federation,  different states  will have different abilities to
deliver comparable sets of services at comparable tax rates.  This gives rise to
fiscal inefficiencies  and fiscal inequities within the  federation, and  these will
64be greater  the greater  the  degree of decentralization.  The elimination  of these
differential  net  fisc'l  benefits  (NFBs)  will require  a set  of equalizing  transfers.
The  overall  effect  of eliminating  these  NFBs  will  be  equivalent  to  having  a
federation  which has the potential  of replicating  a unitary  state  from a financial
point  of view, but  which achieves the benefits  of decentralization.
b.  To  achieve  this  purpose,  it  is extremely  important  that  the  structure  of  the
equalizing  transfers  not  interfere  with  the incentive  for states  to  provide goods
and  services or to  impose taxes.  An ideal  transfer  system  is one  which elimi-
niates NFB  differences by transfers  to  a state  based  on fiscal capacity  relative
to  the  national  average  and  not  on actual  fiscal effort or performance  by the
state.  The simplest  formula  is one which equalizes state  tax  capacities  defined
by applying  a set of national  average  tax rates  to  all of the  state  tax  bases.  It
is desirable  that  all tax  sources be included  and  that  a nationai  average  norm
be used.  The  equalization  system co"ld  also include  differences in need or cost
where these are important  considerations,  though  these would be more difficult
to  implement.
c.  The equalization  system  could be organized  as an explicitly  inter-state  scheme
in  which  the better-off  states  contribute  to  the less-well-off states.  This  might
be  regarded  as  a good  system  since it  creates  the  ability  of the  states  to  ne-
gotiate  their  owIn  scheme.  The disadvantage  is that  the  better-off  states  have
no financial  incentive  to  participate.  The  alternative  is for  the  system  to  be
imposed  by the federal  government.  A problem  with  this  solution  is that  the
federal  government  may find it difficult to extract  negative  equalization  funds
from  the  better-off  states.  This  can  be overcome  by combining  the  equaliza-
tion  scheme with  a  more general  revenue-sharing  scheme in  which the  federal
government  collects more revenues that  it needs and  transfers  to each state  an
equal  per  capita  amount  plus that  state's  equalization  entitlement,  positive  or
negative.
5.  Institutional  Considerations
a.  The  structure  of federal-state  fiscal relations,  especially  the  system  of grants,
must  be  determined  by some  body.  There  are  three  main  alternatives.  The
first  is for the  federal  government  alone to  decide on  it.  This  has  the  distinct
disadvantage  of Liasing the system  towards a centralized  outcome  when one of
the objectives  of the exercise is to ac  ieve as much decentralization  as possible.
The second is to  F -'  *-  a quasi-independent body, such as a grants commis-
sion,  whose puipo,'  . ) design  and  reform  the  system.  These  commissions
have proven  to  be ineffective in some countries,  largely  because  many  of their
65recommendations  have been ignored by the politicians and not implemented.  The
third alternative is to use federal-provincial  committees  to negotiate  the terms of the
system. This system  allows  for explicit  political  input  from the jurisdictions involved.
b.  A case can be made for loosening the constraints of the central planning process in
developing  countries. Central plans tend to lead to a centralization  of authority, and
a reduction in flexibility  and autonomy  at the local level.  Too much discretion from
above can lead to delays in private sector activity as well as to less innovation  and
competition  at the state level.  It is the antithesis  of the sort of fiscal decentralization
we are advocating.
c.  Finally, on a more specific  point, as fiscal responsibility  is decentralized  to the state
and local levels, it would be beneficial to create the institutional  capacity for local
borrowing so that more reliance is placed on borrowing and less on capital grants to
finance capital projects.
REFERENCES
Adamolekun,  Lapido (1991)  "Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria" Publius (21):
1-1.
Ashwe, Chiichii (1986). Fiscal Federalism  in Nigeria. Canberra:  The Australian National
University.
Boadway,  Robin (1990).  The Reforn of Federal-State  Transfers in Mexico.  Processed.
Boadway, Robin (1992).  The Constitutional  Division of Powers: An Economic Perspective.
Ottawa: Minister of Supply  and Services Canada.
Boadway,  Robin W. and Paul A.R. Hobson  (1993).  Federal-Provincial  Fiscal Relations in
Canada Toronto:  Canadian  Tax Foundation.
Boadway,  Robin W. and Frank R. Flatters (1982).  Equalization  in a Federal State: An
Economic  Analysis. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
Boadway,  Robin, W. and Frank R. Flatters (1993).  The Taxation of Natural Resources.
Washington: The World Bank.
Boadway,  Robin W. and Neil Bruce (1984).  Welfare  Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Boadway,  Robin W. an David E. Wildasin  (1984).  Public Sector Economics. Boston, Little,
Brown and Company.
Breton, A. and A. Scott (1978).  The Economic Constitution  of Federal States. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Buchanan, James M. and Charles Goetz (1972).  "Efficiency  Limits of Fiscal Mobility:  An
Assessment  of the Tiebout  Model".  Journal of Public Economics 1, 24-43.
66Flatters, Frank R., J.  Vernon Henderson, and Peter Mieszkowski  (1974). "Public  Goods,
Efficiency and Regional Fiscal Equalization,"  Journal of Public Economics  3, 99-112.
Fox, William and Heng-fu Zou (1992). Local Government  Finance in South Africa.
Washington, D.C.:  The World Bank.  Processed.
Gboyega, Alex (1991).  "Protecting  Local Governments  from Arbitrary State and Federal
Interference: What Prospects for the 1990s?" Publius (21): 45-59.
Musgrave, R.A. (1959).  The Theory of Public Finance.  New York:  McGraw-Hill.
Narayana, M.R. (1992).  "Welfare Gains from Federal Inter-Regional  Fiscal Equalization
Transfers in India:  Some Lessons from the Canadian Experiences", Calgary:  Shastri
Indo-Canadian  Institute. Processed.
Oates, W.E. (1972).  Fiscal  Federalism. New York:  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Phillips, Adedotun (1991).  "Managing  Fiscal Federalism: Revenue  Allocation  Issues" Publius
(21): 103-11.
Rao, Hemlata (1981). Centre-State  Financial  Relations. New Deli:  Allied Publishers  Private
Limited.
Sarma, Atul and B.K. Pradhan (1993).  "Tax Reform and Structural Change in the Indian
Federation".  New Delhi:  Indian Statistical  Institute.
Shah, Anwar (1991). Perspectives  on the Design of Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relations,  Policy,
Research and External Affairs, Working Paper Series No. 726.  Washington.  D.C.:  Ibe
World Bank.
Shah, Anwar (1991). The New Fiscal Federalism  in Brazil, The World Bank Discussion  Paper
Series No. 124.  Washington,  D.C.:  The World Bank.
Shah, Anwar and Zia Qureshi, et. al. (1993). Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relations  in Indonesia.
Washington, D.C.:  The World Bank. Forthcoming  as a World Bank Discussion  Paper.
Thinumaiah,  G. and Hemlata Rao (1986). Finance Commission  and Centre-State  Financial
Relations.  New Delhi:  Ashish Publishing  House.
Urzua, Carlos (1993).  "Tax Refornr ;nd Macroeconomic  Policy in Mexico".  El Colegio de
Mexico, Processed.
Wallich, Christine (1992).  Fiscal  Decentralization: Intergovernmental  Relations in Russia.
Studies of Economies  in Transformation. Paper No., 6, Washington,  D.C.  The World
Bank.
Wildasin, David E. (1986).  Urban  Public Finance. Chur, Switze-land: Harwood  Academic
Publishers.
World Bank (1990).  China: Revenue Mobilization  and Tax Policy. Washington,  D.C.:  The
World Bank.
67Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Tltle  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1235  Eastern Europe's  Experience with  Alfredo Thorne  December '993  N  Jose
Banking  Reforrm:  Is There  a Roi,3  for  33  688
Banks  in the Transrtion`
WPS1236  The Impact of Two-Tier Producer  Maurice Schiff  December 1993  S  Fallon
and Consumer  Food  Pricing  in India  38009
WPS1237 Bank Performance  and the Impact  Yavuz Boray  December  1993  C. Lim
of Financial  Restructuring  in a  Hector  Sierra  30864
Macroeconomic  Framework.  A New
Application
WPS1238 Kenya: Structural  Adjustment  in the  Gurushr;  Swamry  January  1994  V Sadanha
1980s  35742
WPS1239  Princ&pesofRegu.atory  Pc cy  Daid  E  M  Sapp,ngton  Jlr;>ary  '944  WDR
Design  31393
WPS1240  Financing the Storrm Macroe='sc-,  c  WV!!  am Easterfy  Ji.:'y  1  93,  H  Mar1  r
Crisis  n Rusra  1929?3  F  Pa.ic V e  ra d 3 C,,  n3  j
WPS1241  Reguiatior,  Ilnstt2  c -s  3-c  Pab ^  T  Sp: c"  J,  a  9y  94  B  Moore
Corrir^imn  en  'ri!he  BRtsr-  irgo  Vor-,31'-
Telecormnr-n  cato  Src!n'
WP  24  2  F,',arcia  Pc  t  . 5  ,'  f  . f  l  .c  Ja  2y  .a  i3  f 
Ccnt¶res  '  Trz,-s  '  ;J3
WPS1243  Are  Jnst.t2c;r'a  i_v'tc  ,  F _,'  - . . . aJ4  H  ves
Important Ssoi ce cfc  .c a I  e
!n En  wrqng Mac'ets '
WF  S1244 Dlflic,fies  c'  T7arsferr -Ua sP-  L  E  c  J  Kane  .Ja_s  5.994  P  S 2'l-Abcagye
Based Caprta; Req r"eq  u  et  c.  1i5
Oeve.op,r  Co'gres
WPS1  245  The Add n,  Up ProtDer  Stlj'-'  v;,  Ta  a5  Ac yam.  Ja  'y  'q:  A  K
for Primary Comrrmoc  ty  Expor  s  D'-;'  rF  L  ,i"a  -
,n S  .b  Sa  ar  A r -a
WPS1246 Deiermrr;a-ts  of Cross-Coc;r:-y  - a-^.  M: a'c1  'a":iy  rI94  H PA  r
Inco-a3 Inecial;ty  Ar  A,(Yrerterf  206
K,'r,  's  Hypothesis
WPS1247 Comrr.p  ex T r,i  .c  r.s  Urc,'  A-  c  Y  :  sUe  Ji'A-  c,  !  V  S  -'T  Ac<4g,y  e
Urcce'  :a "y  b'a,  s Ms cr  -e Toc  lu'  y5
WPS1248 Do  iomeWic F -s  E3eref&  -c!  ['  a:a  AtheF  t.,  '
4 D Ba c3ntyne
Fore  n [P  'ect l,vc  E-."o  e"  '  0i'CC  A-  HA,'-  '7  ^
frorm  arne, DiiaPolicy  Research  Working Paper  Series
Contact
Ttle  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1249 Competitiveness  and Environmental  Piritta  Sorsa  February  1994  P. Kokila
Standards:  Some  Exploratory  Results  33716
WPS1250 Explaining  Miracles:  Growth  William  Easterly  February  1994  R. Martin
Regressions  Meet  the Gang  of Four  39026
WPS1251 Excise  Taxes  John  F. Due  February  1994  C. Jones
37699
WPS1252  On the Danaers  of Decentralization  Remy  Prud'homme  February  1994  TW1JTD
31005
WPS1253  Can  Competition  Policy  Control  301  J. Michael  Finger  February  1994  M Patena
K. C. Fung  37947
WPS1254 WhatAreOECD  Trade  Preferences  Alexander  J. Yeats  February  1994  J. Jacobson
Worth  to Sub-Saharan  Africa 9 33710
WPS1255  Intrahousehold Resource Allocation:  Lawrence Haddad  February 1994  P. Cook
An Overview  John Hoddinotl  33902
WPS1256  World Fossil Fuel Subsidies and  Bjorn Larsen  February 1994  C. Jones
Global Carbon Emissions in a Model  37699
with Interfuel Substitution
WPS1257  Old-Age Security in Transitlonal  Louise  Fox  February 1994  E. Vincent
Economies  82350
WPS1258  Decentralizing  Infrastructure  HR;cda B  c  Fenr- 3y  1994  WDR
For Good or for il  31393
WPS1259  The Reform of Fiscal Systerrs  n  Robin  BoaEoway  f ebruary '994  C  Jcnus
Developing and Errerging Market  Sandra Roberts  37754
Economies:  A Federalism  Persoocc  ve Anwa,  Shah
WPS1260  When Is a Life Too Costly to Save 9 George L. Van HouAven  Feo'.ary  1994  A  Maranon
Evidence from U S. Environmental  Maureen L Cropper  39074
Regulations